The war is over? Negotiations on the defeat of Saudi Arabia and the victory of Hussites in Yemen

This exchange of prisoners in combination with a sudden and rapid striking rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia has given many people to look at the future with optimism. Is it possible that a brutal war in Yemen, which has caused one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes in the world, will have a happy ending after many years of unsuccessful efforts to achieve peace? Focus translated Thomas June's article about whether a bloody conflict in Yemen could end. Most likely, no.

Unfortunately, there are no talks about a stable peace. Instead, Saudi Arabia tries to manage the results of its unsuccessful war against Hussites. Riyadh wants to minimize the expenses associated with a war, which has long become a loss. I believe that the result of the negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Hussites will be the institutionalization of political and military authorities with Hussites and the formation of Yemen as a fragmented state.

This result does not contribute to stabilization and development, since the initial causes of the Civil War have not gone anywhere. As a result, the risk that Yemen will retreat to violence will remain high and the country's policy will be fragmented in the near future. It is a tragedy for the Yemeni people who suffer from one of the most difficult humanitarian crises in the world.

In addition, it will not be possible to restrain long -term instability within the country - it will inevitably spread over its borders. Yemen, who has long been suffering from instability and violence, entered the current phase of the 2014 war, when the rebels, which were based on the northwest of the country, captured the capital of the Sana.

Saudi Arabia, already concerned about the unstable situation in her southern neighbor, began to worry even more about the rapprochement between her rival Iran and Hussites. At the invitation of an internationally recognized government that was defeated, Saudi Arabia began a military intervention in March 2015 to reject Hussites and restore the government. However, the war quickly dragged Riyadh into the abyss. The Saudi military did not reach any of the government's goals.

By the beginning of 2023, Husvits strengthened their status as the most influential player in Yemen. Iran has greatly deepened his partnership with Hussites and creates a powerful bridgehead along the border of Saudi Arabia. The calculation of Saudi Arabia for interaction with Hussites reflects many factors and changing priorities. The most important thing is the result of the awareness of the hereditary Prince Muhammad Bin Salman that the war in Yemen failed.

From the very beginning of the conflict, the hereditary prince insisted on his continuation, and the result of the war is now associated with his personal image in the country. With the course of the war, Cronprintz realized that the aggressive and adventure foreign policy of the first years of his reign brought more pain than good.

Therefore, Mohammed Bin Salman made radical changes in foreign policy: he is actively working on the stabilization of Saudi foreign relations, as evidenced not only by the rapprochement with Iran, but also by the efforts to settle or at least more effective control of contradictions with neighbors, in particular with Kataar.

He seems to be aware that the dependence of foreign players, especially when they can force Hussites to target rockets and drones that Iran supplies to the kingdom, they are obstacles to his grand vision of economic and social reforms. Therefore, negotiations with Hussites in this context do not relate to peace in Yemen.

On the contrary, the conditions that Saudi Arabia seek to be a way out of the pernicious war, as well as the cessation of Hussites's invasion across the border and strikes with rockets and drones deep into the Saudi territory. For their part, they won a limited victory in the war. This group has become a dominant political and military force in the country.

Therefore, they do not intend to make serious concessions to Saudi Arabia or its international recognized government, which is now scattered between Aden, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. They want the international recognition and legitimation of their power, as well as the institutionalization of their domination in the Sana and the northwest of Yemen. Any armistice is not a step towards a strong peace, but an opportunity to translate the spirit after many years of battles and consolidate the success.

Houses may also be preparing for new offensive operations to expand the territory under their control. It is likely that in the near future, new offensive operations will begin to capture a strategically important and carbohydrate central city of Marib, a controversial Taise south of Sana and part of the west coast. As Saudi Arabia gradually leaves from Yemen, it will already be limited to resistance of these attacks.

The degree of influence of Tehran on Hussite decision making is very controversial and limited, but whatever its level is, it is a minor issue. Much more important here is a relative of interest, and the answer here is clearer. According to Iran's calculations, since his Yemen's partner won, it is time to move to the stage of consolidation of these successes.

Therefore, it supports the efforts of Hussites, aimed not at achieving peace, but at the institutionalization of what seemed unthinkable a few years ago: the fixing of Tehran's position on the southwestern region of the Arabian Peninsula. Iran and hut agree with that. In some media, it was suggested that, as part of the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, Iran agreed to stop or reduce the supply of weapons to Hussites.

It would be strange if Tehran agreed on a constant basis, given the value that his connections with Hussites are currently for Tehran's regional aspirations. However, it is likely that Tehran may agree to temporarily reduce or stop supply, at least in order to provide a break for negotiations that will consolidate his victory.

This is quite achievable: it is well -equipped with weapons, and since the level of violence has declined significantly compared to previous years, they can temporarily undergo less support for their Iranian patrons or without it. In the long run, however, both parties have all the incentives to preserve valuable partnership - in Hussites due to lack of alternative, and in Iran - because of its value as a means of pressure on Saudi Arabia.

According to media reports, the purpose of Riyadh is to offer a "road card" with a long-term truce, after which the intra-Eyemen peace talks will take place. Ideally, this result could stabilize the situation and even reduce violence, at least in the short term. However, this process will face serious obstacles. It is important to understand what the formalization and strengthening of Hussites in the northwest of Yemen will mean and how it will interfere with a stable peaceful process.

The Hussite administration is severely repressive, burned and corrupt. It is intolerance to the opposition, and, more importantly, this movement has neither the inclination or the stimulus to share the real power. Their approach to post -war policy will not be reconciled, but dominant. They also did not show themselves to competent managers of the economy destroyed. Therefore, the prospects for improving the situation on this front are small.

What is left of an internationally recognized government, supported by Saudi Arabia, is weak, corrupt and fragmented. In fact, the main reason for the victory of Hussites is not the support of Iran, but the inability of the government to form a consistent and only Antihusite front.

In a desperate attempt to strengthen the government forces in April 2022, Saudi Arabia ordered the creation of the Council of the Presidential leadership - a wide range of Saudi and Emirate factions, united only by their opposition to Huseites. However, the status of a council as a holistic structure is more fictional than reality.

Theoretically, the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Hussites is intended to open a space for negotiations between the Hussites and the Council of Presidential leadership, perhaps through the UN mediation. In practice, however, the fragile unity of the Council will be a serious blow if or when the support of Saudi Arabia decreases. Moreover, some of the factions that are part of the Council do not intend to put up with the admiration of the power of Hussites without a fight.

It is difficult to imagine how the Presidential Council will survive the consequences of a possible agreement between Saudi Arabia and Hussites. The consequences of the agreement between Hussites and Saudi Arabia will have complex consequences in the south of Yemen, which was independent from 1967 to 1990. The separatist transition council of the South, supported by the United Arab Emirates, is today dominant force in the southwest of the country.

However, it was practically excluded from recent negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Hussites. Although she expressed a timid support, a direct agreement between Riyadh and Hussites will inevitably ignore the dissatisfaction of the Souths, which can eventually encourage the Transitional South Council to new separatist actions. In fact, there is no effective way to re -integrate the southern and northern halves of the country.

The division of Yemen can be the only option, but it will not be harmonious. Increasing tension between supporters of the South Transitional Council in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia increases these problems. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh had competitive interests in Yemen for many years, but they still managed to negotiate in case of differences.

However, the exclusion of Abu Dhabi from the negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Hussites and the dominance of the latter in the north will bring some of these differences to the surface. The United Arab Emirates, in particular, do not intend to give up strong influence they have created in the south of the country through the support of the South Transitional Council and various militias.

In response, Saudi Arabia has intensified its efforts to counteract this impact - this local confrontation will continue and will probably increase. Finally, the fact that current negotiations between Hussites and Saudi Arabia completely exclude Yemeni civil society. However, as Yen's experts often point out, there is no viable path to a sustainable peace without a comprehensive process of dialogue, which includes all sections of the TC society rewrite the social contract.

The problem, however, is that neither Saudi Arabia nor house is interested in maintaining such a process and participating in it. Many experts, for example, claim that only federalism can give a chance to reconcile numerous regional interests and identities of Yemen, but they adhere to a deeply centralized vision of the state.

The media reports that negotiations that last between Hussites and Saudi Arabia can lead to a transition period that will include a truce and a strengthening of confidence, after which the intra -Evemen dialogue will take place. On paper it is definitely the right path. However, in practice, the path to peace will be extremely difficult. What kind of Yemen will look after the transaction? The agreement institutionalizes the domination of Hussites over the northwest of the country.

This may be an inevitable result. But their reign is becoming more cruel and intolerant. It will be another tragic event for the Yemeni people, and the already exhausted decades of conflict and inefficient management. Houses are likely to take advantage of truce to strengthen their reign. This group can abandon the symbolic division of powers and continue to suppress the opposition in their controlled territories. They will undoubtedly strive for expansion of these territories.

Further ambitions of Hussites will face the ambitions of other centers of force. Some factions within the internationally recognized government will undoubtedly reject the dynamics created by the new agreement between Saudi Arabia and Hussites, and will continue the struggle. The Transitional Council of the South is used by a vacuum formed after the departure of Saudi Arabia to continue movement to independence.

It is possible that there will be periods of relative rest, but in the absence of any solving of deeply rooted problems of the country, violence will increase and increase. That is why, instead of peace, the agreement between Hussites and Saudi Arabia is likely to lead to the further institutionalization of the Hussite authorities and the formation of a fragmented and conflict Yemen.

This is a tragedy for the Yemeni people, since one of the most difficult humanitarian crises in the world is unlikely to be resolved. Instability will also go beyond the country. Houses pose a long-term threat to navigation in the Red Sea, and their partnership with Iran will allow them to maintain pressure on Riyadh. Their missiles and drones will continue to have the ability to strike both in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and in the end, possibly in Israel.