Plans with holes. Why the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is unable to embed a dense defense line in the south

" Opinion in the South Donetsk Operational District (OR) and in the Melitopol direction of the enemy's troops continues to implement a set of measures to restore the level of combat capability of the troops (UV), as well as the preparation and conduct of a strategic defense operation. It is a strip of responsibility of the enemy "Vostok". And, it is worth noting that the enemy's troops refer to this issue with all seriousness and responsibility.

It is even worth saying that the level of quality and efficiency of preparation of subordinate parts and connections of this UVRs for a defense operation, in particular in Novopavlovsky (Vodopovarsky) and Orikhiv directions, was checked by a special commission of the headquarters of UV "Vostok" during April 16-18.

In particular, this commission worked in the defense strips of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (IAS) of the 58th All-Military Army (IDA), the 37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (OMSBR) Pacific Fleet (MP Tof).

The content of the enemy's troops' command measures for the preparation of forces and means of this UVRs for a defense operation is the following main measures today: today the grouping of troops (UV) of the enemy "Vostok" consists of: all this is distributed among the following organizational and staff formations: 1) Novopavlovsky Direction: In the reserve of the first queue in the Novopavlovsky direction the command of the enemy's troops concentrated: 2) the Orikhiv direction: in the reserve of the first stage in this direction, another 1 SMEs of TRV were deployed in this direction.

So what is in the first place? Immediately several features: 1) available equipment in the "East" is enough for about 13 tank and 42 motorized rifle battalions (this is in absolute indicators, without taking into account its real technical condition and the degree of outdance). The length of the lane of responsibility in "East" is in a straight line 174-176 km, and taking into account all the "twists" of the front line, then all 240-250 km.

This is about one, more or less equipped with OWT, a battalion for every 4. 5 km of front ("statutory norm"-up to 5 km). That is, the norm is nominally. However, in reality, we see a certain skew - the most equipped, personnel and enemy connections are concentrated in the Novopavlovsky direction, in the Zaporozhye direction (for us Melitopol) this figure is much smaller.

Moreover, all this "nominal" norm is followed by the command of the enemy's troops solely for the one -sided operational posing of their troops. But today it is actively rebuilding it in these directions in a two -sided way. In this case, the command of the enemy troops will have to do 2 things: without additional overturning of more or less significant reserves in the lane of responsibility in "East" his command will still have to use one of these two ways.

And that's all I say, without taking into account the real quality of the bulk of the troops of this group. That is, the level of their real combat capability. And it, today, looks quite "debatable". Especially in the Melitopol direction. The number of all these individual shooting regiments/battalions from territorial troops, mobilization reserve and other "leopards" in UV "East" clearly looks quite "threatening" to the enemy.

2) Another feature is the powerful grouping of RVIA (missile troops and artillery) of the enemy concentrated in this direction. Almost a thousand (including RSSV) "trunks" concentrated and expanded here. And this is clearly not accidental. The enemy's troops are clearly hopeful of the part of the "problems" that I have counted in the first paragraph with the help of art and missiles. Division of OTRC/TRK here also clearly "died down".

3) Also obvious is the presence of the neighboring enemy (I mean in the Dnepr "and" Yug ") of relevant plans of interaction with the" East "in the event of the beginning of the" big offensive "of the Armed Forces in the lane of his responsibility in adjacent areas (so. To speak, "at the joints" - primarily in the area of ​​Vasylivka and north of the carbon). Because some of the reserves of these two are now deployed at the same "joints".

4) As far as I understand, the main problem for myself, today, the command of the enemy's troops in these areas is seen-in the accurate and clear determination of the moment and area of ​​application of the main (s) and auxiliary blows It clearly has no doubt). 5) in the reserve of the enemy in both main directions exclusively territorial troops. And it is clearly not from a good and "rich" life.

- The command of the enemy "Vostok" is actively preparing for a defense operation in a lane of its responsibility. The basis of the forces and means of this is the troops of the 58th name of the southern enemy (both of its main units-the 19th and 42nd MSDs, deployed here). All this "beauty" is substantially strengthened by the whole low other parts and units, including the composition of the Marines and the Airborne Troops (MP and VAT).

- As far as I understand, the enemy hopes in the process of a future defense operation to "stop" the Armed Forces in two main ways - the stubborn maintenance of predefined and equipped areas and lanes of land troops + massive fire of artillery and RV. And also, by drawing massive blows with their airy component both in the combat orders of the advancing Ukrainian troops, as well as on their tactical and operational rear.

Obviously, art + aircraft enemy will begin to work massively and actively during the concentration and deployment of shock groups of the Armed Forces (the problem for the enemy is to clearly and timely identify specific areas and time, so as not and rockets). -In the strategic sense of the command "Obseinen grouping of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the Southwestern TVD" is unlikely to stop their attempts to "step on" in other operating areas.