Russia, Ukraine and negotiation decisions

Negotiations may be needed to terminate the fighting, but the negotiation decision should be behind Kiev. On February 24, the Russian army launched a large -scale invasion of Ukraine on three fronts. However, by the end of March, she had to give up her goal of capturing the Ukrainian capital and leave most of Northern Ukraine. The Kremlin stated that his forces will now focus on the Donbass, which includes the eastern regions of the country, Donetsk and Lugansk.

By mid -July, Russian troops occupied most of the Luhansk region. It was a symbolic victory as a result of three months of grueling battles. Russia has acquired very small new territories. The Russian army, which has lost about 15,000 to 25,000 soldiers killed in battle, and many equipment looks exhausted. The Ukrainian military also suffered heavy losses, but they were supported by the supply of new weapons from the West.

Among other things, Russia's war crimes caused the strong anger of Ukrainians and strengthened their determination to resist. It is hardly a good time to negotiate. To begin with, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Kremlin do not show any signs of readiness for a serious conversation.

Russian officials have voiced their military goals in Ukraine at an early stage: denacification (governments headed by Jewish President), demilitarization, neutrality, recognition of occupied Crimea in the Russian territory and recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk regions by independent "people's republics". In early July, the Secretary of the National Security Council Mykola Patrushev mostly repeated the same.

On July 20, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia has expanded its military goals and sought to seize the territory outside the Donbass. He later added that Moscow tried to put an end to the "unacceptable regime" in Kiev.

The Kremlin's goals remain unchanged - almost complete surrender of Ukraine - despite the fact that Russia's actions on the battlefield have not lived up to expectations and will continue to be even less stunning as Ukrainians take military steps, such as systematic destruction of Russian ammunition.

Do those who call for negotiations see a place for any compromise that would not have Ukraine in a worse position than before the last invasion of February? Even the ceasefire is a danger to the Ukrainian side. This does not guarantee that Russian troops that occupy most of Eastern and Southern Ukraine will leave from there. Ukrainians have suffered this in their own bitter experience.

The ceasefire, agreed in September 2014 and February 2015, was likely to cease hostilities in the Donbass, left under the control of the Russian forces and their proxy representatives, the territory that they never inferior and completely stopped the fire. Moreover, the Russian soldiers can use a ceasefire for regrouping, re -equipment and new attacks on Ukraine. This does not mean that the ceasefire or negotiation should be excluded.

However, given the risks inherent in any possible course for Ukraine, the decision to start ceasefire negotiations or broader negotiations should be left at the discretion of President Vladimir Zelensky and his government. If Ukraine's leadership has come to the conclusion that it should seek settlement, Moscow's unwavering requirements at the negotiations will require from Kiev consideration of concessions.

They will be painful for the Ukrainian side and will almost certainly come across rigid public opposition. The July poll showed that 84% of Ukrainians oppose any territorial concessions. In particular, 77% in eastern Ukraine and 82% in the south, two districts where the most hostilities are taking place. Thus, any negotiations will be associated with the risk to Zelensky and his team. Only they can decide when and whether to start negotiations.

Events on the battlefield and future military realities can affect the calculations in Kiev. If the leaders of Ukraine agree to negotiations, the event should not interfere with them, but the event should also not force them to negotiate until they see this net gain. Western officials should be careful about the opening of any communication channel with Moscow, which the Russians will try to turn into talks behind the back of Ukrainians.

To make it clear, this war has an aggressor and there is a victim. Those who are in favor of Washington's negotiations with Moscow are afraid that if the war continues, Russia may think about the task of blows in the goals in the NATO NATO Member States (NATO). It is not necessary to exclude this opportunity, but the Russian military has a lot of worries with Ukraine. Most likely, she also does not want to direct NATO.

The United States and NATO are certainly very interested in avoiding direct military conflict with Russia. However, whether it is correct to minimize this risk, to ask the Ukrainian government to make concessions to the aggressor, for concessions that could reduce the size and economic viability of the Ukrainian state that would cause an acute internal reaction in the country and which may not put an end to Russian Threats to Ukraine? And the last thing you should think about.