The infantry crisis of the Russian army. Six conclusions about the vulnerable places of the enemy

Now let's consider from whom and how the Russian infantry (motorizeders, paratroopers, marines) and who should perform the functions of infantry of the Armed Forces after 6 months of war: Video day 1. Personnel units of special forces (including even with combat divers), operational parts and detachments , FSB special forces detachments, all units that have individual training are thrown into battle as an infantry. 2. Set on short -term contracts 3–6 months.

Through the center of staff of the Ministry of Education and Science. Selection conditions: after medical commission and psychologist's tests, release is minimal, experience is not necessary. Preparation - from 1 to 4 weeks. Immediate sending to the front in parts of land troops. 3. Star. They are inclined to conclude contracts in their military units.

Therefore, among the casualties in Ukraine are the constituent, who were secretly thrown into the battle, and killed 18-year-old contractors who have concluded a contract 2-3 months after coming to conscript service. For their recruitment, the states of land forces were increased by 137 thousand people. Standards are the main resource of replenishment of the Russian army. 4. Elderly people. The personnel army is taken on an infantry contract for up to 55 years, in reserve formation - up to 60 years.

There is already a message about the death of two 60-year-old Russian infantrymen in Ukraine. 5. Battalions and detachments of Bars (Special Army Reserve Fighting Reserve). It is known about the formation of 20 battalions and detachments of Bars, which were positioned as volunteer for rapid deployment.

The Center for Equipment is the Russian Federation and the well -known field commanders who previously fought in the Donbass, have ties to the Russian Defense Ministry and can gain powers to create their units. The staffing is up to 500 people, in fact, always much less. Formed in March-April as units without their own military equipment and with minimal weapons, which must be given to increase infantry in certain areas.

There is almost no selection and training, contracts for 205 thousand rubles per month. 6. Private military companies Wagner and Liga. The completion center is the commercial structures of the criminal "authority" of Yevgeny Prigogine. In fact, a assault military unit was created with the PEC, which received all kinds of heavy weapons, artillery, tanks, RSSUs and even aircraft. The selection direction is exclusively motivation and risk.

Relations in the team are informal, as in a volunteer detachment, financial payments are larger than in the personnel army, but the results are attached to the task, PVCs are thrown on storms, which leads to heavy losses. 7. Criminal criminals. Prigogine structures are recruited in Wagner PVC. The killers get the choice instead of a long term in the camera to go out, get weapons, money, and the right to rob and kill.

There is already information from Russian sources when a Russian criminal criminal went to war and was destroyed in Ukraine. 8. Volunteer regional battalions and mouths. 85 subjects of the Russian Federation were tasked with forming from 1 to 3 volunteer units. The staffing center is the local center of the Ministry of Defense under a separate program of local authorities.

That is, local officials, through existing social services, are also looking for who could still be sent to the war among low -income and unemployed. This is offered as an option of employment. And to stimulate volunteers, each region from its budget assigns additional one -time and monthly payments that are added to the federal budget payments. Such volunteers with separate names were created from 100 to 300 people. 9. Mobilized in the occupied territory.

All men, even some of those who receive armor from the occupiers, are subject to forced conscription. The assembly center is the occupation administration. The Russian authorities believe that every "released" from Ukraine should prove loyalty to the invaders on the forefront. Mobilization occurs without terms and vacations, mobilized issued money, most of the sources are close to 70 thousand rubles per month, but irregularly, often money is stolen. These are Putin's least capable infantry.

Conclusions: 1. The Russian Federation is very low motivation of the population, the vast majority of people do not want to fight themselves, it is very limited by the contingent of a motivated capable resource. The enemy still has the opportunity to replenish the infantry, but cannot at the moment create a numerical advantage over the Ukrainian infantry. 2. Russia tries to avoid general mobilization, so as not to provoke the mass escape of the population from war and fall in the economy.

Probable personal participation in the war is frightening Russians, it is an important factor in information work. 3. The main source of infantry replenishment will be the constituents, which will be recruited on the contract, the campaign to attract volunteers even for big money demonstrates its inefficiency. Because the money is big, but they can kill.

Therefore, the demonstration of killed Russian military, especially from the contractors who have concluded a contract under the influence of propaganda after February 24, works well on consciousness and this should be taken into account in information work, they read the Internet. It is necessary to strengthen the informing of Russian youth on the popular platforms among them, anti-war videos are needed in chicks, YouTube, other networks, let's say so. 4.

Russian infantry is recruited, overwhelmingly, money. At the average salary in the Russian Federation 38 thousand rubles per month, mercenaries are offered to go for a salary from 205 to 465 thousand rubles per month, to obtain one -time payments from 300 to 500 thousand rubles, as well as social benefits and the status of a participant of hostilities. Short -term contracts serve as an advertising "nickname" - if you do not like it, you will quickly earn a lot of money and return home.

Therefore, the blows to the enemy units that only enter the front and replenished with such gastarbiters are particularly effective, they can act on different methods of information influence. 4. The presence of different completion systems shows that the Russian leadership has made a bet on mobilization in the shortest possible time and with minimal preparation of all available human resources, despite the fact that they are very limited.

Russia prepares infantry by natural selection directly on the front. This suggests that the enemy underestimates the importance of human resource and has a false strategy for a long war. We need to work out our more effective warfare strategy for depletion on the basis of human resources. 5. The terrestrial forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are expanding, qualitative reforms in the organizational and staff structure and combat training do not occur.

We need to intensify exactly where our enemy is not able to make changes, we need to immediately and systematically improve the organization and combat training of the Ukrainian infantry. 6. Critical importance for the combat stability of the Russian infantry, the quality of which is reduced and will continue to decline, will have command points of the tactical link. The sergeants in such a system The enemy does not have time to cook, decentralized management is very weak.