China Vs Taiwan is a Great War. Part One: The Strategy of Wild Corrome

Someone can say that it is a rhetoric aimed at internal propaganda. Maybe so. Or not. These cannot offer either the CCP or the China's people. Stability is not a dream, it's an argument. And stability is questionable. A dream is needed, and the "national association" is similar to something that can be sold to people and the CCP. I believe that these can be theoretically ordered to start surgery against Taiwan.

However, to imagine the contours of the operation that at least for China will look successful, quite difficult. It is the need for a very high probability of success success is the most important factor for analysis. The explanation, as always, will be very long. For a long time, Chang Kayshi's regime in Taiwan hoped for the return of continental China due to the technological benefits of the army. However, with the development of both China and Taiwan, this concept became less realistic.

You can no longer even hope that Taiwan is able to capture China. On the contrary, China can theoretically conduct a Taiwan surgery for military efforts that will not be critical to the Communist Party (I am providing purely military foreign security) and will not cause the problem of survival (again from purely security). At least it seemed until the time Vladimir Putin decided to seize Ukraine.

The "savage strategy" after Liberalization of Taiwan and with the development of the UNAC among the US establishment is a generalization, but most will be the main concept of defense of the island was the "savage strategy", which you probably heard. Although it was finally formulated under this name much later. But not only China changed, Taiwan changed.

For a country that depends on the functioning of the developed export economy, the idea of ​​meeting the enemy on the coast and to be reached during the guerrilla resistance in construction is no longer so attractive. The enemy is unlikely to be able to win, but you are not capable of winning, because you lose not just ports, but all logistics, all of the industry and eventually the whole economy. It is not like a victory for the present Taiwan, rather a defeat.

Therefore, Taiwan's power consistently ignored the "concept of savage" as the only one, wishing to implement a more global concept that was to prevent the landing of significant communists for the form. In this concept, the "savage strategy" is just a component, and not even the most important. However, there was a problem here. The fact is that such a defense strategy means that Taiwan should be able, if not destroy China.

This is just as the Commander -in -Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny sees a guarantee of peace for Ukraine from Russia. It is the scope of Taiwan's militarization, which should be approximately commensurate with China's militarization, and Taiwan cannot and will not be able to spend comparable funds on his own army. The United States could help in the creation of such army and Navy. But for them it is a very risky strategy.

According to the US political establishment, it is a too aggressive step that can speed up the war instead of turning it away. The announcement of this level of militarization, according to the US, would have led to the fact that China would have started to act immediately. The re -equipment of the army is a long time, the re -equipment of the fleet is even longer.

But why should China wait for the end of Taiwan's army to wait for the moment when Taiwan's fleet becomes an equivalent fleet of China? In addition, the United States very rationally believed that to equalize the military forces of Taiwan and China, perhaps unrealistic - and Taiwan still loses this arms race, undermining the economy.

In China, the same militarization would not be considered a desire to protect Taiwan, but the desire to help Taiwan to seize China or the desire to neutralize China. So, the United States has always been happy to develop the Taiwan Land Army, air defense, to provide some anti -ship missiles, to teach mobile guerrilla groups, to saturate them with "Javelins", "Styngers". Even they agreed to develop fighter aviation and self -propelled artillery.

But to develop something else - without much enthusiasm, so as not to scare China. And before our war, there was a certain contradiction between the "savage strategy" that the United States supported and the concept of total defense that Taiwan and Taiwanese business wanted to receive. The rhetoric of the Taiwanese military reminded the rhetoric of Ukraine before the war: "Thank you for the" Javelins ", but we need planes, missiles and tanks, and it is preferably ships and submarines.

" Ukraine just wanted to get them for free, and Taiwan was ready to pay. There was a compromise between the concept of total lesion and the "savage strategy". It is a point re -equipment of the Taiwanese army, which was called the general defense strategy. The idea was that the point re -equipment of Taiwan's army and a set of asymmetrical actions could neutralize China's fleet without the creation of a Taiwanese fleet and air forces, which China could have considered a threat to its own existence.

That is, the modern Taiwan defense forces were created precisely in order to counteract the modern army and Navy of China. Just as we counteract Russia now. Somehow everything was built. What was the "savage strategy" based on and why many people thought it could be the basic concept of defense? The fortress in the Sea of ​​Taiwan is actually a mountain in the sea. A whole ridge of rocks, former volcanoes and a tropical forest.

And fortification, part of which Taiwan are eagerly shown to everyone, and some probably do not show anyone. On the coast, almost 90% of the population lives almost everywhere, because there are about 90% of the population. Twenty. Millions. People. The building is interrupted by industrial, fields, channels, logistics terminals. In fact, all the main roads except the mountain, and the junctions are surrounded by buildings. The solutions are multilevel.

The island's logistics coherence is very high, but it is not roads through the desert - the infantry will be able to cling to a lot on the coast, and every solution can easily turn into a trap. And this is only about civilian buildings. Dozens of rivers are coming to the west coast. Some of them are not very wide, but a few are really huge and allow the Taiwans, even in the conditions of successful naval landing, cut off the enemy and interfere with its advance.

Yes, there are enough fields and visually empty places in Taiwan, but each of them does not allow the enemy to concentrate the means and strength there. The one who lands there will be at risk of attacks because of the buildings, under the fire of a shot artillery and will not be able to move forward without problems, because there is nowhere and nowhere. Fortification in Taiwan is not only in the mountains and under them. Old firing points are on the coast, they are quite known.

There seems to be new. The gentle shores and places are convenient for covering the landing, though there are not many. Again, I cannot know about the current state of affairs, once changed tightly. Currently, Taiwan Land Forces are preparing for surgery in the same place. The son can enter the army in the same place and with the same task as his father, and maybe grandfather. Old fortification for conservation.

I do not know whether they will use it, whether they undermine or replace it, because I do not know the island's defense plan. However, there are modern examples of fortification in Taiwan: systemic, embedded in relief, recessed and probably huge. It may be even merged into the network between large rivers. That is, even in conditions where there is a landing on the surface, control of forces and means may not be lost. Some of the new fortifications are probably imitation.

In total, the island's population is 24 million people in an area equal to one and a half area of ​​Kyiv region. And if you do not take into account the mountains, it is just the Kyiv region. Taiwan is an island, so the majority of the population will not be evacuated (later). That is, the Defense Army will have dozens, perhaps even hundreds of thousands of additional fighters.

Taiwan's theoretical calculation is several million, but, Okay, let's imagine that for millions of weapons will simply be wrapped, so let hundreds of thousands. These fighters will be united in self -defense - it is called protection troops or somehow - and will act as a reinforcement of the personnel army. When you can either die in the basement or make it dearly pay for your own life, because you keep their weapons in your hands, Taiwan will choose resistance. Just like Ukrainians.

Taiwan is a mandatory call from the age of 19. Most men served in the army, although the service life has been shortened. They will be called, but there will be hundreds of thousands of volunteers in addition to the personnel army (130,000) and Marines (15,000). Taiwanese is a guru city camouflage that is nowhere else to be used in the world. They mask the tanks under the piles of garbage and civilian equipment, very well masked.

Yes, these are old tanks, but to maintain infantry and against light technique of the marine landing they will be enough. Even satellite and air intelligence will be forced to breed goals in very difficult conditions. Even in the absence or destruction of the Taiwanese fleet, if the communists are bombing airfields, the Taiwan Taiwan operation will be hell.

China has never had operations in modern history, though remotely similar in size to surgery, which should be implemented for Taiwan occupation. China's army of China is only 2 million people in total who have never been moved to such volumes. Even the only system of logistics was created in China in fact in the last decade, before that there was no global logistics, but there was logistics of military districts within the country.

In such circumstances, it was difficult to imagine that China's power, which is very dependent on the western markets, can make a suicide decision to start a landing operation. However, as we now know from our own experience, it is not a very strong argument. That is why Taiwan did not particularly rely on a purely guerrilla war and land forces. The Ukrainian dicorobraz, when Si supported Putin's invasion of Ukraine, the plan seemed ideal.

Russia had to conduct an operation to capture Ukraine very quickly. After that, Putin had to negotiate with Europe to continue exports of gas and resources, splitting Europe from the inside and separating from the United States. Like, the Russians still captured Ukraine, you will have an energy crisis, why do we have this enmity, let us negotiate, otherwise I can go on -for example, in the Baltic country. Of course, we should see the split of NATO. Italy would be silent. France would ask for peace.

Germany had to become an ally of the Russian Federation for gas issues. Si could further assess the level of counteraction to NATO, the EU and the US - Russia, to estimate the level of sanctions and to make a decision on the format of Taiwan occupation. However, everything happened. The Ukrainian dioxide did not give up, the Russian personnel army was destroyed, the EU and NATO united, and the sanctions, although not caused by Russia, were very, very, very painful to Putin's regime.

I assume that the Communists have finally come to an important conclusion that the technical re -equipment of the army in the absence of experience and proven logistics in practice does not allow to realize the technological benefits of their own army. The war of the Russian Federation in Ukraine is a very worrying bell for China, because the latter's army is somewhere the same in its essence as Russian.

In the face of total corruption and the absence of initiative in the troops, no one can say whether China will be able to exercise its advantage over Taiwan, especially Taiwan surgery will be several times more difficult than Russia's operation. In addition, authoritarian regimes traditionally do not trust the army and keep it quite small and weak (that is, controlled). Autocrats are afraid of generals. Now China is forced to really calculate how long it takes to capture Taiwan. It's not a week.

This is at least a month before the landing operation itself begins with great forces. Now everyone understands and see how Russia cannot exercise a total advantage in aircraft and rocket weapons on the battlefield in a dense air defense. Now everyone see that the destruction of infrastructure does not want to give up, but even vice versa.

Now everyone see that Ukrainian territorial defense is able to counteract the personnel Russian army, and believe me, Taiwanese self -defense will be much more effective. And the experience of the Russian personnel army was greater than the experience of Chinese (the experience, not the training). And it did not help.

Therefore, the implementation of only the "savage strategy" in Taiwan can lead to the fact that China will not be able to capture Taiwan, even with the conditions of the total advantage of Nvak. And even if the US does not interfere with the conflict personally, but will only help the island. Prospects for communists are not very optimistic.

As an assumption: a war scenario, let's try to imagine what Taiwan surgery will look like in new realities if the operation of the operation is made in the coming months or years. We will consider the whole conflict in the option when the US will avoid direct intervention and any direct clashes with China. This is not because I think it is unlikely - no one really knows how the United States will act (and this is a fech).

This is just because the conflict around Taiwan with direct US participation is another conflict, and its name is the Third World War. Similarly, we do not consider the use of nuclear weapons, because it is again a completely different war. Similarly, we will not consider Japan's actions, which may act independently of the US. But we will not consider the option in which China attack on Taiwan will be synchronized with the DPRK attack on South Korea. Zero thesis.

China will only have one attempt so the attack will not be unexpected. The quantitative and even qualitative advantage of China over Taiwan is not in doubt, but now everyone has realized that this may not be enough. If China wants to capture Taiwan, mobilization and mass preparation will need to start before starting surgery. It will be both mobilization of personnel and mobilization of means and logistics and preparation for a landing operation.

You will also need to expand the fleet and prepare the fleet base for possible strokes. Such actions will be impossible to hide. Taiwan's help will increase significantly immediately after China begins its own preparation. In the conditions where we have already brought everything we need to implement the "savage strategy", there is a high probability that Taiwan will receive the latest and complex defense systems.

At least Taiwan will receive artillery from the beginning of preparation of China, air defense facilities, as well as rockets, fighters - together with anti -ship and other weapons, anti -ship missiles of marine and land base, anti -tank missiles and MSrk, small arms, mobile radars, etc. Taiwan may also get a sip -scene system, namely Thaad systems. And we are talking purely about the prospects of the landing. And it will still need to be survived. The first thesis. China has a huge fleet.

It even exceeds the US Navy. But it is unlikely that China will be able to use all its fleet at the same time under the current conditions. In response to the beginning of preparations for aggression, China will receive sanctions, American - for sure. We are a bright precedent. In addition, the Navy of China will be forced to provide the island blockade at considerable distance from its own shores.

According to the axiom, we have adopted the hypothesis that the US would avoid intervention and excluded the actions of the fleet of Japan. However, China cannot consider this option an axiom, so it should allocate part of the fleet to cover the area from a possible attack on US and Japan fleets. It will also be necessary to somehow cover the fleet's own bases from the attack of unmanned seawater (here we also created a precedent), sabotage, mines and more. The second thesis.

China is unlikely to be able to use the entire Land Army against Taiwan. First, it is not necessary, and secondly, it will be necessary to cover the entire territory of China. However, the expansion of the naval infantry (40,000) and the forces of the forces (including the forces of coastal defense and, most likely, erected intelligence units of the NVAK in the amount of about 40,000-50,000) will mostly occur by retraining the personnel units of the land.

And the mobilized will be connected to the personnel army in the rest of the country. That is, the landings, even the most capable of the whole army, will be trained, but still mostly not specialists in sea landing. In addition, the Chinese paradigm was based on the involvement of specialized civilian vessels - but initially built for the possibility of using marines - to provide a landing.

Такі кораблі за умов щільної протикорабельної оборони все одно будуть достатньо вразливими для протидії тайванцям. Третя теза.

Інтеграція Китаю у світову економіку на порядок перевищує аналогічну інтеграцію Росії, тому навряд чи до початку операції санкційний режим для Китаю буде занадто жорстким.

Але внаслідок тієї ж інтеграції навіть незначні санкції можуть завдати Китаю набагато більше шкоди, ніж Росії – більш жорсткі. І почнуть діяти ці санкції з моменту початку підготовки, а не з моменту початку операції.

Власне, мобілізація зробить початок операції для Китаю неминучим у більшості сценаріїв, бо Китай знову ж таки не може дозволити собі втратити обличчя.

Початок мобілізації призведе до економічних втрат, тому вона не може бути тривалою та відповідно не зможе стати системною. Бонусом – ковідні обмеження, що впливатимуть на перебіг мобілізації. Четверта теза.

Мала площа Тайваню, з одного боку, створює для командування сил оборони острова проблеми, бо ховати засоби та сили буде складно. Висока ймовірність, що Тайвань зможе зберегти власні аеродроми та свій чималий парк винищувачів під час перших ракетних та авіаційних ударів.

Під питанням лишається забезпечення авіації та флоту пальним в умовах тотальної блокади острова – у відкритих джерелах інформації не дуже багато, а та, що є, найімовірніше, неповна. П’ята теза.

Тайванський флот не дуже чисельний, але він буде під парасолькою острівної ППО та ПРО. Якість цієї оборони відома та дуже висока, як показав досвід України. Оцінити якість китайської ракетної зброї та систем ППО і ПРО наразі неможливо.

Найімовірніше, китайському флоту вдасться нейтралізувати чи заблокувати флот Тайваню, але ціна буде високою. Утім, тайванські протикорабельні ракети розміщуються не лише на кораблях, але й на мобільних установках на суходолі.

Морський десант зможе висаджуватися тільки після того, як буде подавлено берегові установки, інакше на них чекає те саме, що й армію РФ під Одесою. Знищити берегові ПКР завадять сили ППО Тайваню.

Навіть якщо не вдасться використати винищувачі, кількість комплексів ППО у Тайваню значна, як на таку територію. Шоста теза. Кібервійна може бути успішною проти інфраструктури й тільки короткий проміжок часу.

Кібератаки можуть спричинити хаос серед цивільних, обвалити урядові сайти, припинити роботу публічного та залізничного транспорту, призупинити платежі.

Але досі ніхто й ніколи не спромігся здійснити успішний кібервплив на глобальну спроможність армії виконувати свої обов’язки, тим паче в таких обсягах.

Відключення електроенергії на декілька діб, відсутність мобільного інтернету та проблеми з транспортом мало впливають на здатність ППО та флоту протидіяти ракетній атаці.

Я не дуже кваліфікована в цьому питанні людина, але вважаю малоймовірною кібератаку Китаю, що здатна завадити роботі ППО, ПРО та флоту Тайваню. Ідемо далі.

Китай потребуватиме часу на підготовку, тому Тайвань також зможе провести цілий комплекс заходів перед початком активної фази операції.

Тайваню потрібно буде накопичити запаси ракет, палива, стрілецької зброї, ПТРК і ПЗРК та почати навчання сухопутних сил оборони острова". Також можна провести накопичення запасів їжі та води, часткову евакуацію цивільних з острова.

Жінок та дітей може бути вивезено до інших країн під час підготовки, що зменшить навантаження на комунальну систему острова. Під час мобілізації китайські хакери намагатимуться завдати удару по тайванській армії та інфраструктурі.

Та навіть якщо Китай зможе використати тисячі ракет та сотні літаків, а Тайвань не буде здатний знищити пускові НВАК, навряд чи знищення ППО та ПРО Тайваню буде швидким.

 Досвід України свідчить, що прорив щільної ППО країною, що не має такого досвіду, – справа не така стрімка.

Звісно, під час мобілізації Китай зможе нарощувати запаси власних ракет, але проблемою стане визначити розташування сил оборони Тайваню та забезпечити цілевказання. Згадана раніше щільна забудова дозволить переміщувати комплекси ППО, ПРО та ПКО, робити іміт аційні цілі.

За умов вдалого маскування Китай багато ракет витрачатиме в молоко. Основа ППО Тайваню – це радар з фазованою решіткою AN/FPS-115 PAVE PAWS на горі Лешань (не плутати з містом Лешань у материковому Китаї).

Він, за відкритими даними, дозволяє бачити цілі на дистанції до 5000 км, тобто на всій території Китаю. Це один із шести найпотужніших радарів у світі.

Зараз його модернізують або будуть модернізувати найближчим часом (контракт на пів мільярда доларів з терміном виконання – 2023 рік). Конструювали цей радар саме для того, щоб він міг пережити ракетні та авіаційні напади Китаю.

Він прикритий власними засобами ППО та навіть зенітною артилерією, тому зерг-раш аналогами іранських мопедів малоймовірний, до того ж радар стоїть на горі заввишки 2600 м. Є дані, що радар має власні імітаційні елементи, але це видається неправдою, бо головна решітка одна.

На жаль, Тайвань відмовився від постачання другого радара, тому цей зосереджений на територіях Китаю та китайському узбережжі. А те, що, умовно кажучи, за спиною в Тайваню – цей радар не бачить. Але такі дані Тайвань зможе отримувати від флоту США.

Цей радар здатний бачити навіть кораблі та супутники. Невідомо, чи є (чи будуть) у Тайваню протикосмічні комплекси, що здатні збивати супутники Китаю.

Але розклад прольоту цих супутників Тайвань точно матиме, і це дуже допоможе в маскуванні сил і засобів тайванців від деталізованої супутникової розвідки. До того ж радар є частиною радарної системи США, тобто об’єднаний у мережу з іншими радарами.

Це значно ускладнить дії китайського флоту, бо для флоту США переміщення китайців будуть як на долоні. Як я вже казав, пряме зіткнення малоймовірне, проте Китай може вважати інакше, тому йому доведеться реагувати на переміщення флоту США.