Air battles of war with Russia: advice and conclusions of military experts

The sky over Ukraine is reminiscent of the aerial version of the Battle of the Sommy of the First World War. Unlike the first frantic days of fighting for Kiev, no more of the parties tries to penetrate deep into the enemy's airspace. Like the anti-aircraft machine guns in French and German trenches, many launchers of the Earth-Borings class and fighters would make such an attempt suicide. This led to the emergence of drawing airspace.

Both sides exchange strokes using UAVs and ammunition, both sides are fired at each other along the front line from the extremely small heights, but neither side can create a crucial battle power in the air. But that doesn't mean they don't try. The hopeless situation in the air is supported by continuing persistent actions, both Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian troops continue to demand Western aviation, and Russia has created new parks of Iranian drones.

Air defense systems are a prominent place in recent help packages in Kiev, while Russia is based on its large reserves of long -range weapons. In short, the lack of dynamics demonstrates the value of airspace for both sides, since any new effort responds quickly to the enemy. Focus has translated the new text of Michael Stefanovich, Robert "Chuck" Norris, Christof Pyubeni and Dave Blair, dedicated to the lessons of the Air Battles of Ukraine and Russia.

Imagine the effects of a breakthrough of one of the sides in the airspace. The most important Western assistance of Kiev comes on highways and railways from Eastern Europe. If Russian aviation is able to intercept these convoy, it will be difficult for Ukrainian land troops to keep their positions, not to mention offensive operations.

And if Russia gained an advantage in the air, it could use its almost endless stock of uncontrollable weapons to destroy Ukrainian cities, as Russian bombers in Aleppo did. Conversely, if Ukrainian assaults are able to turn Russian supply lines into "Death Road", Russian artillery and armored troops will fall out without fuel and ammunition.

Through these high rates, Ukrainian air defense goes to horrible risks daily, despite the quantitative 10: 1 quantitative ratio and technological lag from the enemy. None of the parties can defeat in air battles, but none of the parties can afford to lose.

It is unreasonable to make categorical statements about technology or tactics based on incomplete information in unfinished conflict, but last year of hostilities indicates several key principles that can underpin on future Western concepts and investments. In order to win the next war, the forces of the United States and allies must invest not only in the interpretive data channels and operational compatibility, but also in joint training, so that interaction becomes everyday interaction.

In the end, the air power is not necessarily intended for the offensive - the dynamics of defense can also be crucial. There may be sufficient strategies for the denial of airspace, and inexpensive lower -range platforms are a good tool for achieving this goal. From the very beginning, Ukraine has aggressively used a wide range of means to deprive Russia of the ability to use its airspace.

The reduction of the offensive potential of the Russian air power was a necessary condition for changing the situation around Kiev, keeping the front line in the east, Kharkiv breakthrough and Kherson offensive. The preservation of this pathological situation is an expensive event that requires great courage and self -sacrifice from Ukrainian troops, as well as great efforts and resources from partners of the Ukrainian people.

If you return to the Battle of Sommi, no serious analyst of the First World War will identify static lines of trenches with lack of strategic importance. The problem of breakdown of defense networks was probably the main feature of that war. The hopeless situation has created many innovations on the battlefield: the French and the British built tanks, and the Germans developed tactics of assails that played an important role in the Second World War.

Similarly, Ukraine has developed a very intelligent tactics and has cooperated with international partners to create new combinations of opportunities, such as high-speed anti-radiation Mig-29, which shoots rockets. Russia reciprocated, peeling deeper into its stocks of modern weapons and re -profiling the old heritage. The art of planning operations is to know where you need to win and where you should simply prevent the opponent's victory.

In the Air Deaf Age, the United States and their allies will not be able to count on the same exceptional advantage they enjoyed in recent wars. Therefore, the United States must learn to play both logs - to learn how to close the enemy access to the airspace when they cannot control it themselves, and at the same time find ways to return control at the decisive moments.

In future conflicts, the Union Air Force does not have to keep the airspace - they just need to provide an advantage in the air at the right time and in the right place to maintain decisive action of the Joint Forces. After victory in Pearl Harbor, Japanese strategists found that their forces were infected with "victorious disease". Success in the early stages of struggle led to excessive self -confidence, which, for its part, forced strategists to fight the way they wanted, not as they needed.

After decades, the US allies in the air are also easy to accept air domination for granted. Indeed, in the institutional memory of the US Armed Forces, their power in the aerial sphere has always been sufficient to unilaterally win the air campaign and then quickly move to the promotion of other joint campaigns. But these are dangerous assumptions when you deal with the enemy's Air Force, who, if not advantage, at least a parity.

The Allied Air Force must double efforts in the air, as our united forces are built on their success, but other forces need to be added to the joint air campaign. The essence of a successful air campaign lies in its ability to overcome the restriction of land battle and to strike deep blows into the heart of the enemy's military power. However, it costs expensive and requires prison from pilots.

Therefore, pilots imagine the enemy as a system, identify the key nodes and influence them to bring the system in order - whether it is a fuel composition in the Second World War, or Vietnam Bridges, or a network of homemade explosive devices in later conflicts. Such action can and should be carried out from different spaces. Israeli Air Force is a great example, launching anti -radiological rockets from trucks based on targeting data from UAVs and pilots on the battlefield.

Ukrainian troops carry out a skillful air campaign, combining the possibilities of different spaces. They detect key enemy nodes, such as supply warehouses and anti -aircraft missiles using air, cosmic and cybernetic means, and then use a combination of air and ground fire to neutralize these units. Without a targeting strategy, which is focused on the key nodes of the system, the huge scale of Russian artillery would significantly impair the chances of Ukrainian Land Forces.

Similarly, the combination of fire from the air and land is the defense mission of air defense of the Ukrainian air campaign. Even the maritime sphere played a role: the volume of winged rockets would be much larger if Russia has preserved the opportunity to output its fleet near the Ukrainian coast. Applying an interpretive approach to the air campaign, Ukraine offset its shortcomings in the aerial sphere and achieved access to air space access, which is a great achievement.

A common general -military approach to air power has serious historical precedents. During the North African World War II campaign, the Royal Air Force was in a difficult situation compared to the technological and numerical lift. In order to eliminate the enemy's power in the air, the ancestors of special air service carried out secret raids on enemy air basements in the Mediterranean area. Whether the aircraft is destroyed in the air, or in the fire on Earth, is of no particular importance.

The fact remains - it is no longer a factor in struggle. When the German terrestrial radars inflicted heavy losses by allied bombers, British special forces seized and taken out the radar of Freya during a bold raid to Brunava in 1941. Their success ultimately led to the creation of effective countermeasures in the form of dipole reflectors, which saved the lives of many bombers' crews.

The same principles also worked in six decades, when the coalition forces of special operations provided data on targeting the B-52 crews during the Taliban campaign. The key lesson for US and allies planners is to actively achieve operational compatibility - both on the Technical Front with the help of technologies of jointly abused command and management, and on the tactical front through exercises.

According to US Air Force headquarters General Brown, US forces should be "conceptually integrated" in all domains and alliances. Moreover, the Allies' agencies should strengthen their Air Force in order to prevail in the air campaign, thereby helping the land and marine forces to prevent the enemy of combat power in operational depth.

For most of American history, air power has been a game of disposal, which helps to explain the religious quote of General "Hep" Arnold: "attack is the essence of the air stroke. " However, this is not always true for allies and partners of America, and the US will be bad if their air services are not able to effectively conduct defense air campaigns. Ukraine has taken a predominantly defensive approach to its air campaign because of need.

If the Ukrainians tried to strike mass blows at the airfields and central nodes of the Russian air defense network, they would suffer unacceptable losses. Instead, they used a "corrosion strategy", causing friction and resistance to Russia's attempt to capture domination in the air. In doing so, they did not allow Russia to apply their cruel but tragically effective Syrian strategy of carpet bombing of civilian infrastructure with uncontrollable blunt bombs.

The operational and humanitarian consequences of this tactics would be catastrophic. Russia continues to have outrageous violations of the laws of war with its weapons, but the problem of winged missiles is still not as spicy as the problem of blunt bombs. Therefore, Ukraine's defense strategy should be recognized as successful, especially in view of the ratio of strength. There are also demonstrative historical precedents.

During the Battle of Britain, the royal Air Force showed great discipline in the destruction of the enemy and avoiding decisive clashes. With the help of the Radar system, the British Spitfayers and Harrikeins were gaining height, making one dive on the offensive German connections, and then went away. Germany was forced to move from the destruction of the royal Air Force to the defeat of the civilian population. This decisive mistake allowed Britain to continue corrosion strategy.

Repeating this tactic day after day, week by week, the royal Air Force weakened Luftwaffe so much that they could no longer continue surgery. The threats with which Washington and his allies face at the Atlantic and Pacific theaters are well suited for defensive campaigns. In the case of Taiwan and Baltic, small adolescent countries or partners face the risk of invading a larger neighbor.

If the attacked party, such as China or Russia, will get control over the airspace of one of these countries, this country will still be able to try to use, challenge or control the airspace below 3,000 meters with high performance. Small drones, such as Ukrainian "Aero -Divide", successfully cite the artillery on the target and dump unmanaged ammunition, which would be valuable to slow or distract the attacking party.

Moreover, in this situation, integrated air defense systems, special operations and traditional portable missile installations can also be used to counteract the enemy at low altitudes. Finally, it should be noted that the air campaign was an integral aspect of Ukrainian success today. Allied military planners and strategists should get the right lessons without confusing the lack of dynamics in the airspace with its lack of importance.

The ability of the Ukrainian Air Force and Air Forces to use all areas in the air campaign demonstrates the value of the pathological situation. Carrying out an exemplary defense air campaign provides many examples, especially for those allies and partners who are in a disadvantageous position in terms of air domination.