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Russian military in occupied Kherson, July 25 (photo: Reuters/Alexander Ermochen...

Not only in Ukraine. What war did Russia count on and why it cannot succeed - an expert

Russian military in occupied Kherson, July 25 (photo: Reuters/Alexander Ermochenko) A specialist in the field of international security problems Yuri Fedorov told in an interview with NV what the war was counting on, and why it could not succeed. "The greatest drawback of the Russian army in the form in which it was created after 2008, first Minister of Defense Anatoliy Serdyukov, then Minister Sergei Shoigu, is the orientation to fast, massive offensive actions.

The Russian army was created as an army of Blitzkrig, ”he stressed. According to Fedorov, this is evident from the structure of Russian troops, which have a large proportion of airborne troops and landing assaults, and a relatively small proportion of land forces-less than 30%. "For comparison, it can be said that the land troops, for example, are almost half of the Chinese army," the expert said.

He said that such an army was intended to solve two problems: rapid operations in the south against the countries of the South Caucasus, against Ukraine, and then Moldova and Blitzkrigo against the Baltic States. “It was envisaged to rapidly, within 2-3 days, classes of these countries with massive use of airborne joints and access to the Polish border in the area of ​​Swanlok, or advancement to Warsaw to the Vistula border.

Such plans were designed, judging from Russian exercises and analytical materials of the Western centers that had access to serious information, ”Fedorov explained. The expert added that the Russian army was not designed for a long war and now it is visible in Ukraine. “A mobilization reserve has not been created, and a large number of people needed to form a second strategic echelon and create reserves have not been called to the Armed Forces.

The lack of a mobilization reserve is the greatest defect, even the defect of the Russian army, which causes its low combat efficiency, ”he said. As an example, Fedorov pointed out that the solution of a rather limited task-the exit on the border of the Luhansk region and the capture of relatively small cities of Popasna, the Rubizhne and agglomeration of Severodonetsk-Lysychansk took four months. "The Russian army is generally weak," the expert stated.

Previously, former Defense Minister Andriy Zagorodniuk also stated that the Russians were not preparing for the war with Ukraine to be so long. The weakest link in the Russian army he called guiding and personnel. According to the American Institute for War Research (ISW), the Russians can only have two major offensive operations in Ukraine. This is an offensive on Siversk and Bakhmut of Donetsk region.