The event is rebuilt. What is the D10 closed club where Russia and China will not be accepted

On October 11, the Minister of Finance and the Deputy Prime Minister of Canadian Christian Friland made a loud call to the French Swing [the restructuring of the supply chains so that the industrialized countries of the West receive most of the income from politically friendly economies-focus]. Freeland has stated that the democratic countries of the world must unite in order to rebuild global supply chains according to "our deepest principles.

" She did not stop there, stating the need to strengthen a much wider range of links between democratic countries to negate their collective vulnerability to autocratic regimes. This expanded concept of FRAND SHROTING will be used to counteract a number of problems, including economic competition and competition in the field of security with China, weakening of democracy and growth of autocracy, excessive dependence on Russian energy, unreliable supply chains and economic inequality, as well as.

green energy. " According to Friland, connections with autocratic regimes should be restricted, and "intermediate" states should be encouraged to accept the values ​​of this new democracy club. Her proposal is now called "Friland Doctrine". Focus has translated Kerry Baku and Michael V. Manulak about how democratic countries should be defended and united. Christ Friland is not alone in calling for deepest cooperation between democracies.

Former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson in 2020 advocated the creation of a D10 Democrati Democrati group. In 202, US President Joe Biden held his first summit for democracy, hoping to push the activity of the democratic camp. The idea of ​​an extended league or concert of democracies has been circulating for over ten years. Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fog Rasmussen called for an economic version of the NATO mutual defense regulation.

The Climate Climate, proposed by William Nordhous, is essentially a "greener" version of this idea and provides for financial penalties for climate law violators. There are no shortages in increasing cooperation between democratic countries, but there is still a consensus on the institutional form and orientation of such interaction. According to Frialand Ministers, membership should be restricted by democratic like-minded countries. Autocracy such as Russia and China should not apply.

The institutional boundaries will be limited by club members, and the focus will be on the promotion of common values. The desire to close the rows for democracy has an indisputable appeal. However, it will not be easy to create a new democracic club, and it runs the risk of leaving counter -productive forms of polarization. Instead, we propose a democratic security initiative that will take into account these risks and soften them, actively strengthening democratic norms and institutions.

Instead of a closed club based on democratic authority, our proposal provides for bridges with states that are not entirely democracy, and at the same time reducing strategic vulnerability. At the same time, autocratic communication channels remain open to solving global problems such as climate change and nuclear weapons. Despite its attractiveness in the present geopolitical context, fring chow is associated with serious risks.

Strengthening and institutionalizing the gap between democracy and autocratia in the world, fanding chowing can deepen polarization. Although the period of geopolitical rivalry seems inevitable, we have not yet entered the new "Cold War". Claimary and pandemic change problems give rise to common interests of a completely different scale than we have known to us since the first Cold War.

The links between China and democratic countries are much closer than in the case of the Soviet Union in the 1940s. Increasing polarization is also dangerous. Due to the renewal of nuclear arsenals, today's security environment is less stable than during the last part of the Cold War. Many fences used to regulate tensions and negotiation channels created to limit the development and use of weapons of mass destruction are dismantled or destroyed.

Therefore, we should be careful about the assumption that the world somehow knows how to wage cold wars, and can safely manage the rivalry of the great powers. Instead of strengthening the friendly states, too straightforward support of friends of democracy risks deepening a global split and increasing the risk of security. It is also unclear what means you can carry out a flex-chow.

What will it use to reorient trade and investment models - gingerbread or whip? If such steps are cost -effective and politically achievable, which still prevented the states from introducing them? The strengthening of the gap between democracy and autocratia also leaves less opportunities to expand ties with those countries that Minister Friland calls "intermediate": not autocratic but not completely democratic.

Minister Friland proposes to stimulate these countries to join a new exclusive club by adopting high standards of democracy. The problem is that the doubling of democracy standards as the main separate line between those who enter and who is not included in the club does not actually meet other interests, such as safety or stabilization of supply chains, which are assigned to the solution.

One of the conclusions from the war in Ukraine was the indecision of many intermediate countries - not to mention some major democratic states - in condemning Russian aggression. In fact, the unity of the West against Russia has created a reverse situation where some countries, including autocracy, such as Saudi Arabia, intermediate states such as Cuba, great democracy such as India, or allies such as Turkey, used war to increase their international levers and play for both teams.

They did it by buying cheap oil, achieving the reduction of Russia's debt, taking places in the oil markets formed as a result of sanctions, or, in the case of Turkey, delaying the entry of Finland and Sweden in NATO. Similarly, at the meetings of G20 leaders at Bali or at the UN Conference on Climate Change in Egypt, it became clear that intermediate countries did not want to choose between world democracies and China. There is no desire to join one of the sides in the Cold War 2. 0.

Deepening geopolitical split, democracy run the risk of scoring a wedge with each other and these countries. Yes, intermediate countries will most likely be a key field of rivalry with autocrats. In his speech before the Valdai club in October 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin urged these countries to resist the "dominance" of the democratic event.

In recent years, China and Russia have expanded their ties in the Global South, while democratic governments have not been able to respond effectively. In the next decade of communication outside a small circle of real declining democracies should be strengthened and strengthened. French chow also risks to undermine the existing institutional architecture of international cooperation. In fact, it is in uncomfortable and several two -digit relationships with the available multilateral system.

In the speech of Ministers, Frialand has only one reference to the world trade organization, and it is unclear how its plan can be agreed with the principle of non -discrimination, which underlies global trade relations for over 70 years. Strengthening polarization will also affect the United Nations and other multilateral institutions where liberal democracies need support for other countries to strengthen international order building blocks.

Admission to a closed Democracies Club will lead to the opposite result. Despite the risks associated with a fring chowing, the global course of autocracy and democracy rollback need answers. We propose to create a cooperation forum between countries that undertake to co -establish key democratic foundations. The initiative to combat the spread of weapons, created in 2003, serves as a model for such agreements.

This initiative, which has gained significant development since its emergence during the "global war with terror", already allows for flexible multi -sector cooperation between 107 countries to counteract the distribution of weapons of mass destruction and its delivery means. Similarly, the democratic security initiative will become an informal institution, without bureaucracy and legal obligations.

The proposed initiative will support the promocratic forces around the world, preventing them from turning back and strengthening their sustainability. Instead of using economic instruments, the initiative will mainly rely on political tools to solve a predominantly political problem. It will strengthen democratic norms, contributing to cooperation, in particular with increasing the potential of democracy in partnership with intermediate countries.

It will be a platform for the exchange of advanced experiences to promote and protect democracy from new challenges such as misinformation. The main features of this proposal are of particular importance. Participation will be characterized by openness and inclusivity. The initiative to combat the spread is a model where participation is determined by the unilateral approval of the Government of the statement of termination principles. Countries are actually self -collection.

In our case, the main determining factor in participation could be, for example, the approval of a statement about democratic principles that determine the goals of groups. The club will be more accessible to intermediate countries using network diplomacy to create interest coalitions and provide obligations in those industries that are most important for global democracy and security.

The main group of democratic countries will invite and encourage intermediate states to join the initiative, approving its principles. Those intermediate states that are not yet able to sign principles but still want to participate in strengthening the potential of democracy as observers. The goal will be the constant expansion of the circle of democracies. At the same time, this approach will limit polarization: the less rigid the inclusion criteria will be, the greater the effect.

The proposed group will be used to guide bridges, not to erect barriers. In fact, instead of rewarding for democratic achievements, the initiative will support countries in their pursuit of democracy. This open position should be limited to states. Most of the concepts of a spindle, including the concept proposed by the Ministry of Friland, are extremely statistical.

However, measures should be taken to ensure the participation of non -state and subnational entities that contribute to the achievement of the goals of such an agreement. Although this approach leaves the opportunity to participate in states whose democratic features are still in question that these entities will in the future comply with the statements about democratic principles worthy of this risk. In principle, these doors should remain open to everyone.

The democratic security initiative would prompt states to associate themselves with already predetermined and new norms and obligations on democracy. Although several existing forums are engaged in appropriate work, most of them win from consolidation within stronger institutional framework. For example, the first US summit for democracy, which took place in December 2021, led to the adoption of 750 obligations and proclamation of the year of action to strengthen democracy.

However, this initiative is unlikely to survive the US administration, as it is closely linked to President Biden and depends entirely on the US leadership. Network diplomacy around democratic obligations could become a platform for cooperation in multilateral forums. Again, the initiative to combat spread is a good example. The efforts to combat the spread of the weapons used within this initiative support the implementation of the resolution 1540 of the UN Security Council.

Our new initiative could strengthen the UN activities in areas such as political rights, freedom of thought and association. It could also contribute to the observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These agreements are a stronghold against the global autocracy march.

With regard to the regime of international trade, democratic cooperation will seek compliance with the rules of the world organization of trade and market standards, such as non -discrimination and the regime of most assistance. Instead of friends with another camp of international players, our proposal is designed to achieve specific goals. They will be stated in the statement of democratic principles that will determine the scope of the initiative.

Our proposal is aimed at a purposeful strengthening of democracy at the time of global need. The broader and more uncertain concept of FREN SHROTING can be used by those who have purely protectionist goals. Economic security cooperation should be limited by the steps necessary to reduce strategic vulnerability in industries that adversely affect democracy, such as energy, critical minerals, semiconductors, 5G infrastructure, elections, misinformation or cybersecurity.

States will focus on other world issues related to democracy. Cooperation on various issues, such as climate change, debt relief and food safety, should be considered a central element of joint efforts, since these problems can potentially be obstacles to long -term democratization. Such cooperation will be attractive to intermediate states.

A clear definition of the boundaries of this new initiative will create what Kevin Radd calls "managed strategic competition" with autocratic countries like China and Russia. Here, a clear distinction between differences can be a crystallization of expectations about areas of potential rapprochement in the minds of both competitors and democratic countries.

Just as weapons control and scientific cooperation arrangements served as a discharge during the Cold War, global problems can be used as raw materials for a gradual and purposeful improvement of communication channels with autocrats. Since the world has been in a decisive decade to mitigate climate change and faces problems in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, we believe that this industry is quite ripe for cooperation.

The wider and poorly adopted version of the FRAND SHROTING will bring less clarity and possibly contribute to the further expansion of the areas of competition. In addition, the initiative we have proposed is the institutional basis of multilateral cooperation. The need to resist the growth of the impact of autocractions creates real problems for the international system and for the besieged democracies of the world.

However, abandoning the paradigm of confrontation with the zero sum creates serious risks. Our proposal takes into account these risks, opening the path to an open, globally attracted international position. Such openness plays on the hand of democracies and solves the most important problems of interdependence facing the international system. Kerry Bak - Ambassador of Canada to NATO from 2015 to 2018.

Before that, she held leadership positions at the Canadian Foreign Ministry, responsible for international security, "Big Seven", Afghanistan, Africa and Latin America, as well as the Middle East. Michael V. Manalak is Associate Professor of the Norman Paterson International Relations School for Carlton University. He is the author of Change in Global Environmental Politics, published in 2022 by the University of Cambridge.