Peter I and Vladimir. What is Putin's fantasies about the modern king

His hints in the era of Peter I and Catherine II are superficial, cheerful and focused on what academics call the history of great people. He likes kings, generals and heroes who turned back Russian history. He wants to emphasize Peter's first victories in 1709 and the conquest of Crimea Catherine in 1783, not the numerous defeat, which were celebrated in the coming years. So far, Putin has publicly ignored the long, painful and grueling history of Russian imperialism of the eighteenth century.

Focus translated the new text of Alexander Burns, dedicated to Putin's obsession with the wars of the XVIII century. A few months before the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin tried on the role of a history teacher. The Northern War, Poltava, Crimea . . . For Putin, the answers to these questions were obvious. Peter's armies were in Poltava, now located in the northeast of Ukraine, conducting a great struggle with the West, which at that time represented the Swedish King Charles XII.

Unfortunately for Putin, one of the students paid more attention to details than a general picture, and said: "In fact, this war was called not a seven-year but the northern war. " It is easy to understand how the Putin version of Russian history - only victory and no cruel defeat - could lead to false confidence with which he ordered his troops into Ukraine in February last year.

But despite his public rhetoric and periodic mistakes, Putin undoubtedly knows a real history that stands behind Russia's long and difficult struggle in the XVIII century. Now that Russia is preparing for a longer conflict in Ukraine, this story offers examples on which it can rely on - the stories of Russian armies that overcome serious defeats, restore strength and go to victory.

Considering how Putin uses and distorts the history of the Russian wars of the XVIII century, we can predict that he plans for his own war. Like most heads of state, Putin is quite cheerful, publicly discussing the heroes of his country. In his speeches, Putin first pays attention to two epochs: the reign of Peter the Great, which lasted from 1700 to 1721, and the rule of Catherine the Great from 1768 to 1783.

In the context of Russian history of the XVIII century, it would be like that, speaking of the war for independence, you mentioned Lexington and Concord, and then went to Yorktown. The sequence can be correct, but many nuances and difficulties are lost. Speaking about the 350th anniversary of Peter the first in June last year, Putin said: "Almost nothing has changed. Strange! You come to this understanding. Peter I Northern War for 21 years.

It would seem there, fought with Sweden, something He rejected . . . he did not turn anything! He returned! Yes, so it is! Where St. Petersburg was founded- when he laid the new capital, none of the countries of Europe recognized this territory by Russia, everyone recognized it in Sweden, and from the beginning with the Finnish The Slavs lived in the Hungarian peoples, and the territory was under the control of the Russian state. It was in the western direction. It concerns Narva - his first hikes.

What did he get there? He returned. And strengthened. " Here Putin justifies the invasion of Ukraine, citing the history of Russia of the XVIII century. Turning Peter I from the conqueror into a grievant, Putin creates a narrative behind which he and the historical Russian leader are in the same position. In his opinion, European states have refused to recognize Russia's legitimate claims for Peter, just as the international community does not recognize the capture of Crimea.

Putin usually formulates his vision of the Northern War as a competition of great powers, in which the enemy was the West, and the field of battle was Ukraine. During the Northern War, the most righteous resistance of Ukrainians in Russia occurred in 1708-1709, when Hetman Ivan Mazepa, together with several thousand Hetman's cavalry and a large number of Zaporozhye Cossacks, formed an alliance with the Swedish King Charles XII.

Swedish, Hetman and Zaporizhzhya troops were defeated under Poltava Peter in 1709. In the period of the Russian Empire and in modern pro -Russian circles, the followers of Mazepa, or Mazepin, became synonymous with traitors of Putin's vision of Russia and Ukraine. But with all the attention of Peter, Putin's favorite theme is fifteen years between 1768 and 1783, when Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire, deprived it of the Crimean Khanate and annexed Crimea.

Putin said Catherine won less than Peter and that he was fond of it. Catherine the Great headed Russia of this era, and Putin seems to be identified with her. Putin remembers her as a conqueror and founder of cities. The Russian armies were very successful during the period, they were headed by such famous personalities as Petro Rumyantsev and Grigory Potemkin. (By the way, during the retreat from Kherson, the Russian troops removed the bones of Gregory Potemkin from St. Catherine's Cathedral).

During these years, Russia fought with the weakening Ottoman Empire. In 1690, few would put on the state of Muscovites against the Ottoman troops. But by the 1760s, the Ottoman Armed Forces weakened. As a result, in the war of 1768, Catherine's armies moved from victory to victory during the battles for Largu, Kagul and Kerch. Here, as in the Northern War, the Putin narrative claims that victories over other great powers allowed Russia to destroy Ukraine.

Victory over the Ottomans allowed Catherine to treat Ukrainian Cossacks freely. In 1764, Kateryna founded a new province called Novorossiysk to strengthen her border, which began to cover Kharkiv, Donbas, the old possessions of the Crimean Khanate and the territory of the Cossack troops disbanded. Putin and Patriarch Cyril sing this story. Since 2014, commentators have noted that Putin uses the name "Novorossiysk".

On January 16, 2023, the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian society announced a competition for Russian students, dedicated to the annexation of Crimea Catherine II and the founding of Novorossiysk. And, not surprisingly, in response to the invasion, Ukrainians began to dismantle the statues of the Empress, who remained in their territory. In the heroic interpretation of Putin, Peter I won the West during the Northern War, which blocked any attempts of Ukrainian independence.

Then Catherine II defeated the Ottoman Empire and seized Crimea and Southern Ukraine. Heroes such as Petro Rumyantsev, Alexander Suvorov and Fyodor Ushakov have always provided the victory of Russia. In 1708, the Russian commander proudly reported to the Kremlin: "The robbery in Bakhmut was taken and destroyed, and the inhabitants were killed. " Putin undoubtedly hopes to receive a similar report from day to day.

However, such narrative is hidden by the fact that Russia's historical struggle for the conquest of its southern borders has lasted for centuries, and even its decisive phase lasted for over a hundred years. Reporting about his triumphs, Putin silences the failures and expenses associated with Russian imperialism. The fact that Putin leaves out of mind is no less indicative than his boasting of the XVIII century by the commanders.

Despite the victory won during this period, Moscow suffered a lot of difficult casualties. Russia was defeated and failure during the offensive in the Crimea in 1687, 1689, 1736, 1737, 1738 and 1739. She also suffered losses in Azov in 1695, Narva in 1700, Frautaduct in 1706, Golovchyna in 1708, Prut River in 1711, Gross-Egersdorf in 1757, CornDorf in 1751, Khotyn in 1769, Ishmael. 1789, Porrasalm in 1789 and Utismalm in 1789.

Then, as now, the defeat often occurred due to insufficient material and technical training and excessive self-confidence. In July 1711, Peter led the Russian army to a catastrophic battle with the Ottomans of the Prut River. The king was misleading his approximate, believing, like Putin in Ukraine, that the victory will be fast and easy and that his troops would meet Christians of the Ottoman Empire as liberators. But Osman's army surrounded his troops and forced him to surrender.

According to one of the recent campaign studies, "Peter . . . has almost lost everything - his army, his territorial conquests since 1701, his throne - because the army was put in a disadvantage on Prut due to poor intelligence and inadequate logistics. " Only the condescension of the Osman empire in peace negotiations allowed Peter to retreat, restore his forces and continue the parallel war against the Swedish Empire.

Putin was silent about this incident, and after the invasion of Ukraine, Russian critics of his policy noticed this silence. It is interesting that Putin has never publicly mentioned the career of Field Marshal Burkhard von Munnich, one of the most important figures in the military history of Russia of the XVIII century. During the war for Crimea in 1735, the Munichi allowed himself to be delighted with a deceptive sense of security, which led to a number of false-optimistic estimates.

In 1736 he provided: "Azov will be ours . . . Perhaps even Crimea will go to us. " Then in 1737: "All Crimea will be subordinated to our control. " Until 1738 he had already felt the conquest of modern Romania. Finally, bolder, in 1739: "The standards and flags of the Empress will be placed - where, you ask? In Constantinople, in the oldest Greek Christian Church, Saint Sophia.

" The historians of the nineteenth century criticized Munnich's self-confidence in the light of his unsuccessful actions in the war of 1735-1739. But Brian L. Davis presented a new interpretation of this conflict, arguing that the municles and his subordinates did the lessons from each year and that by 1739 the Russian military came out of conflict with new tactical doctrines and a fortified logistical system.

If Russia suffered numerous defeats, how did it finally be the winner of one conflict after another? During the eighteenth century, Russia demonstrated the impressive ability to suffer losses, overcome losses, then gain new forces and restore the offensive. During the Northern War, Russia used its labor to compensate for the insufficient number of the army and avoid internal problems. Today, Russia often recruits men from rural areas and tries to avoid conscription from large city centers.

On the contrary, in the period from 1700 to 1705, Moscow was more likely to avoid conscription from the countryside to preserve its agricultural economy. Instead, the Russian state was first and foremost called by servants, artisans and urban poor. As the war continued, it was not enough, and from 1705 to 1711 the state turned to the rural agricultural population. This conscription system existed until the end of the eighteenth century, providing the Russian army with people.

During the war against the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire in the 1730s, the Russians lost more people from diseases, weather and wanderings than from the enemy's actions. In order to preserve the army of 120 thousand, only at this theater of fighting the Russians were forced in 1738-1739 to call 150 thousand people in 1738-1739. It is an amendment to today's population of Russia is equivalent to 1. 4 million losses.

As Putin prepares the Russian people for a long war in Ukraine, he will increasingly turn to this head of Russian history. On December 22, Putin's government registered a general education plan for Russian students, which have topics such as "Overcoming the first failures in the Northern War. " Russia won the Crimea not from the first or even sixth attempt. In the present war, the Russian military initially made many mistakes. But the same can be said about many conflicts of the eighteenth century.

Today, Russia retains the ability to restore its forces for several months or years. In addition, nuclear restraint further facilitates Putin's ability to continue to embody his fantasies about the modern king. Only the determination of Ukraine and the support of the event can determine whether his reinceptions will be more like Peter's failure on the Prut River or the conquest of Catherine at the end of the century. Oleksandr S.