"Tens of thousands will die." Zagorodniuk evaluated when the Russian Federation ended mobilized and how Ukraine will break the course of the war. Interview

In an interview with Radio NV, he told how the aggressor supports the same number of military people who were at the beginning of the invasion; How much more war can last with such intensity and what Ukraine needs to break the course of fighting in its favor. Video of the day - 45 thousand soldiers of the Russian army have already been in Ukraine, according to reports of the General Staff. Is it a lot? -It is a lot, great for any war.

Of course, these are not the figures we saw in the wars of the last century, such as the Second World War, but for the modern wars of the XXI century is a lot. Moreover, it is a lot for a country such as Russia that has declared the whole world about its invincibility that it is a "second army in the world.

" These losses say that there is no practical experience of war against a strong enemy in Russia, and Ukraine was much better prepared for this war than it was considered Russia and the Western world, and inflicts very serious losses by the enemy. We need to understand that these numbers are confirmed. This means that this figure has some 1: 3 wounded. Most of these wounded, of course, will no longer return to the tasks, so we neutralized a huge part of Russia's army.

The whole foreign press writes about it now. Although it should be noted that the estimates of the dead are very different from those that give NATO countries, but the order of the plus minus is the same: we are talking about tens of thousands of people in any case. And our main partners - Britain and America - confirm that up to a third of the opportunities, capabilities of the Russian Federation we have neutralized.

- How close is it to a turning point for Russia? - Unfortunately, there is no sustainable civil society in the Russian Federation, for which the loss of a large number of servicemen would be some turning point.

How do you determine the turning point of the point? Is this unwillingness of servicemen to continue their service? There are such cases, we are talking about thousands of refusals who either desert or return, or even refuse to go to the war zone, some other way to express their unwillingness to participate in this war. This is already enough. We already have a large number of [refusals] to say that this process is already system.

What are the other consequences? We often hear it from Western analysts or diplomats that the Russian society will see that the army is losing a huge number of people wounded or dead and some destructive processes in Russia itself will begin. We have not approached this point. And to expect that it will wake up society, there is no point in now. It is actually in the sleeping or non -existent state.

Most of society generally supports this war, not even understanding what is being said under the influence of propaganda. Or under the influence of their imperial ambitions, which they have grown for decades. - And if you talk about the combat capability of the army, you say, almost a third of the group that was preparing for the offensive to Ukraine, Russia has lost.

Last week, the American edition of The New York Times published a material stating that such significant losses of occupiers did not allow them to achieve goals. It is clear that it is very difficult to hope for civil society . . . - It is impossible. - It has been danced for years and displaced in the Russian Federation.

But can the army's inability to continue the fighting? -We have already closed the issue about civil society, because in fact there is nothing more about: first, it is not, secondly, it is not capable of any action. And the forecast for this indicator is negative - we have nothing to expect from them in the near future. Now about tasks. How does the situation look like now? They constantly support the plus minus of the same number of personnel, the offensive military units.

I am not talking about Rosgvardi, the FSB, which are involved in the so -called "stabilization" in temporarily occupied territories, namely units that are trying to participate in the offensive actions. These are the same 150 thousand, of which they started. They had 150 thousand [military] and remains. It is clear that most of them are either dead or injured, or went for other reasons, or captured. Most of them no longer participate [in the war]. But the essential part is still fighting.

They also send a new personnel. Question: Will they be able to maintain the same intensity of hostilities as they are currently? Yes, they can. They now have a staff to maintain the same intensity we see now. Will they be able to significantly increase it and go into some new offensive actions? In our opinion, no. They will not be able to. But this is not only a matter of personnel.

This is first and foremost a question of their complex capabilities - both personnel, logistics, weapons and military equipment, and the capacity of the officers. We are not talking about the sergeants, because they still have a Soviet doctrine, and they are actually older soldiers who do not play the role of us. The same story with infrastructure.

When we impress, for example, warehouses of their weapons or strike their weapons and military equipment, at command points, it does not significantly reduce personnel, but very much reduces their ability to step. Therefore, the forecast for them is now negative. They will not be able to take active offensive actions in the permanent perspective and somehow increase significantly, for example, twice the presence they will not succeed.

But this is not a positive news, because they will be able to maintain the same intensity as it is now a very long time. They constantly carry out the so -called hidden mobilization. This means that they constantly sign new contracts, translate the term warriors to contracts, hire mercenaries from [PVC] Wagner and other organizations. This process is endless. Their organizational capacity of military administration bodies is not currently able to hire half a million people.

There are no officers, no one will [cook them]. They can take half a million people, but will not be able to put them in units, go to performance. - Will the judgment be correct: the war will not end in the next month or in the next year? - If everything is the way they now, they will be able to maintain the same intensity and number of years, because they have many people. It will be low quality staff, that is, the personnel will be poorly prepared, not motivated, poorly guided.

They can not potentially increase their number, but maintain it for years. The same situation with weapons and military equipment: there will be no high -tech weapons, but old weapons, which can nevertheless perform any tasks, they will have a lot. The warehouses have a huge number of stocks of old equipment. This old technique is incapacitated. They will not be able to increase it twice. But they constantly carry out work on its recovery and will be placed on duty, then send to us.

If we do not break the situation at the expense of the technological advantage that our partners will give us, then, unfortunately, we can still see this war for a long time. It can take some years, and can then go into a less intense conflict, which can take a very long time. This situation is not suitable, we are not interesting. We have a long war for years at all. Russia will be exhausted.

Somewhere in the end of this year - in the middle of the next they will begin very serious economic problems thanks to sanctions, but they will still find outputs somehow and will continue their existence. Therefore, it is critical to us now to negotiate with our partners about giving a number of weapons sufficient for counter -offensive actions. This is absolutely possible.

- Will we have such a ability, if suddenly partners are delayed, will not provide weapons so quickly? And do you see that there are steps in order for us to have this ability to not sit on the needle supply of Western weapons? - These are really two questions. Will we have the ability if partners are delayed? Our task is not to delay. Now the forecasts are positive.

We see that we can accumulate weapons and reach some critical mass after some period in order to equip additional units, to prepare them, which will be enough to start normal counter -offensive actions on a number of operating areas. What will we not be able to do? Quickly increase the ability at the expense of our own economy, because we have no technologies.

What do we need? Of course, first of all, the means of fire damage to a long distance, and the more the operating depth we can work with, the better. These should be long -range artillery tools, volley fire systems, and other systems. Our industry does not produce this. We cannot deploy production right now. We can close the part of the unmanned aviation or with the involvement of some technologies.

But we will not be able to expand the terrestrial, artillery [production] quickly, so we will depend on cooperation with partners, it is absolutely critical to us. - How many partners have such weapons that they can give us? The number of the same HIMARS or M270 M270 RSDs and the United States, NATO partners, is measured by several hundred.

For example, for HIMARS, if I'm not mistaken, there are 400 units around the world, and in general, such high -precision RSSUs up to a thousand, about eight hundred. Have we already wiped dust on their defensive complexes? - Do you mean, have you launched production? - Exactly. - Some factories are already working, this process is happening. Some positions we really need hundreds, but there are thousands of them.

Therefore, [enough] even those stocks that are currently or are on combat duty are already in units and perform tasks. We already have experience when [weapons] were transferred directly from the units, this is not the first time. Not only do us pass the means that are in excess assets, in warehouses lie, dust is or old. We are handed over to the work units before.

They just have to understand that, of course, this process is so painful, because there are a large number of units that try to say "we need to support combat capability, tasks. " But this process is not the first day, not the first month. Our military diplomats know what arguments to find, how it works, so it is a matter of time, I think.

- Recently, a message from the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense stating that four volunteers for sending to Ukraine are being prepared in Chechnya. But at the same time, the report states that Ukraine is encouraged to go torture and intimidation. What are the volunteers? There are incision analyzes from which regions Russian soldiers fight and die here.

The most percentage is the Tuva, from which the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Sergey Shoigu, then - Buryatia, in Chechnya there are also many losses. Is it an opportunity for them to get a ticket to the world? There is no other way other than to commit such atrocities as they did in the north of Ukraine, in the Kyiv region? - About volunteers.

Those who worked with the Armed Forces in the post -Soviet period are very well aware of how mobilization measures are being taken - plans for the regions. [We] have many of these things still, but we have already advanced. In Russia, it is no different: they are losing their plans for the hire of these volunteers. They, of course, tell how peaceful, how normal they do, make money and return home. From some regions there are people who are recorded just to make money normally and everything.

They do not understand where they go, do not understand the chances of their return alive, intact, etc. But they also have no other motivation - just people go to work. And where it does not work, where society is more or less interconnected and disseminates information about how it is predicted in Ukraine, how it all happens, what they have a chance of survival, they do not gain these quantities. They invent different options, how to tighten them.

It depends on how much they manage to deceive people to go. The main task of the recruiter is to complete the plan, everything is very simple. Why are they gaining no more ethnic Russians? Because the opinion of some part of a society that is somewhere far from the center affects the mood of the center itself. How much they will die, in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other major cities, no one is concerned about anyone.

And even if they lose 100 or 200 thousand people, most of the residents of the central cities will sleep quietly and not worry very much. Russia has lost millions or hundreds of thousands of people exactly from the Covid-19-this has not changed the attitude of the Russians to its government. These things do not affect most society. They try not to shake society. Everyone remembers how the Soviet society was negative in the 1980s before the war in Afghanistan.

Everyone understands that this negativity, which was, suffered a very much government image; The collapse of the Soviet Union was partly because of dissatisfaction with the war in Afghanistan. They don't want to repeat these mistakes. So far, they do this, they do not repeat them. Let's see how it goes on. But for us it's all just information for analysis. This should not affect our actions because they go on a completely different track. Our track is to defeat the weapon.

Whoever it is - ethnic Russians, Tuvinka, boom - there is no difference. If he comes to our territory, he should return no longer alive or wounded so that he no longer returns. By the way, partly confirms our numbers of the General Staff about the number of wounded things that in the border cities the hospitals are killed by the wounded. It's a fact. Like in Sevastopol, in Belgorod, in other cities, in Mozyr. We talk about tens of thousands - that's for sure.

-What do you know about the possibilities of involving the Russo-Ukrainian war of representatives of the DPRK? The information also appeared in the media about 100,000 Koreans, which can fight in Ukraine. There is constantly information about Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan. Comment on this information. - The main thing is that we have to remember: this war is not infantry, but artillery.

Therefore, first of all, we have to worry about how many fire damage, how many RSZV, artillery, how many such units. How many people who are unable to work on this, from Uzbekistan, will, honestly, worry a little less. If these are just infantry units, then we will impress them with our means and they will die tens of thousands, after which they will not return here. First of all, you need to look at the technological set of hostile forces, as it grows or does not grow.