Russia was calculated-the gas-aggressor state no longer needs the EU. How did it succeed
Such a distribution of sources of supply is transitional on the way to an energy balance with a zero gas share from a terrorist state. It is likely that the next heating season of the European Union will take place without any cubic meter of Russian gas. At least this is indicated by several factors.
Little steps to gas independence, first of all, is a rather clear position of the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany on the unreliability of the Russian gas monopolist Gazprom as a natural gas supplier. Second, the intensification of new infrastructure projects that actually reorient the EU to supply gas from east to southwest.
These trends were quite clear during the recent meeting of the Prime Minister of Israel, Jair Lapid and German Chancellor Olaf Soltz, who discussed the prospect of replacing Russian gas in the EU market. Currently, it is about starting supply from 2023 to 20 billion cubic meters of Israeli gas. Such arrangements are issued quite realistic due to the sufficiency of natural gas reserves in Israel and the readiness of the infrastructure to export them.
It is quite indicative that in the first half of 2022, gas production in Israel increased by 22% and in the annual calculation amounted to 10. 85 billion cubic meters, and exports increased by 35%, reaching a level of 4. 59 billion cubic meters. Based on current production and internal consumption modes, Israel can already replace 3% of the current supply of Russian gas to the EU market.
Most of the total volume of gas came from Tamar and Leviathan (the eastern part of the Israeli economic zone in the Mediterranean), which, according to experts, contain more than 630 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves. These volumes of blue fuel can be transported into the European market with pipeline transport (90 km long) to the Egypt's gas network (connection point near the city of El-Rar), and then shipped to ship-gas pipelines through LNG-terminals of Idku and Damiette.
However, the further increase in the volume of natural gas production and increasing its exports has several geopolitical risks. The possibilities and risks of substitution are the first - Lebanon and Israel are formally under war since 1948, so the issue of border demarcation remains unregulated. The official Beirut uses this fact and makes claims to Jerusalem on the Mediterranean Shelf (856 sq. Such disputes also contain a military component.
For example, in June 2022, after the start of the drilling work, Lebanon raised four drones into the sky, which were promptly eliminated by the Israeli Defense Army. On the eve of this incident, the leader of the paramilitary Islamist organization Gisbolla was threatened with high -precision artillery.
In fact, Lebanon's claims against Karish's gas field are unfounded, and the official Beirut has sufficient gas reserves in its Mediterranean economic zone, but the lack of sufficient investment leaves all the products on paper. It is possible that there may be some agreement between the Kremlin and Lebanon on the escalation of this conflict in exchange for financial and technical assistance.
Secondly, it is a limited capacity of the infrastructure that is already in operation and, accordingly, the need to build a new corridor of Israeli gas supply to the EU. Such a project exists is the East EastMed, which will combine Israel's shelf deposits with mainland Greece through Cyprus and Crete Islands. At the same time, the narrow place of this pipeline is its laying through the economic zone of Lebanon.
This nuance, most likely, will take advantage of the Russian Federation and try in various ways to block alternative supply of blue fuel to the European market. There is also another scenario of implementation of this infrastructure project-a change in the trajectory of laying the pipeline in order to connect it to the gas transmission system of Turkey, which has been working closely with the terrorist state recently.
Suddenly Eastmed is not realized? Such an indefinite prospect of Eastmed has pushed Israel to develop another project - the energy bridge between the Middle East and the EU. In Jerusalem, they decided that in the event of failure with the construction of the Eastern pipeline, energy -generating stations on natural gas will be built, and the electricity produced will be transported to the European market. To implement it, you need to lay two cables.
The first will be held at the bottom of the Mediterranean through the island of Crete and will connect Egypt and Greece. The second cable will allow Israel to export electricity to the EU. The seriousness of these intentions is evidenced by the introduction of the mentioned infrastructure objects to the prospective plan for the development of the European Energy System.
However, there are also risks of Russia's interference with such a model of cooperation, such as the deployment of speculation and provocations around Rosatom's participation in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Egypt (Ed-Daba). The aggressor can also use similar pressure on the official Ankara, as it was also admitted to the construction of the Akkuy nuclear power plant.