Ostatné

You will not plant inflation in the tank or why do not have enough money to pay the military?

"Instead of supplements to the military, we can say," Hooray! ", We have inflation lower than in Turkey, Moldova, Argentina and even Hungary. Inflation in the tank will not be planted and you will not invite in the trench. If inflation in Ukraine was 3022 in Ukraine 3022 -40%, and monetary conditions were a little softer, then nothing catastrophic happened. " Consumer inflation in Ukraine for 2022 at the level of 26. 6% was a rather good indicator.

Despite the war, Ukraine has missed a number of countries where there were no wars and other cataclysms in global inflation Ranking. According to the results of April 2023, the European inflation Ranking from countries where inflation exceeded 10%, looked as follows: as we can see, in the European region, the "inflation plague" is still raging in the European region. Inflation for the UK and Sweden at the level of more than 10% is something unprecedented. In total, the EU inflation at 8.

3% is also too much for the European Union. Although inflation in the region has declined, the problem persists. Instead of surcharges to the military, we can say, "Hooray!", We have inflation lower than in Turkey, Moldova, Argentina and even Hungary. But you will not put inflation in the tank and you will not invite it to the trench. In the face of war and increasing dependence on imports, having inflation at the level of 17.

9%, passing forward Moldova, Hungary and Turkey, and very close to inflation from the Baltic, Slovakia and Poland is a very large luxury for our country. Inflation in Ukraine has tried to quench the famine over the second half of 2022. The effect of the NBU rate at the level of 25% has led to the fact that as of December 31, 20122, the debt for deposit certificates of the NBU (NBU) increased to UAH 457 billion, which caused interesting consequences.

The first - the increase in the obligations of the Central Bank under the NBU NBU has led to the profit of the NBU, which was supposed to transfer to the state budget, more reserves were calculated, since the amount of profit that the NBU directs to the state budget was reduced by 10% of its obligations' Identation. As a result, according to my estimates, the effect from the high rate led to a decrease in the profit that was transferred to the state budget, about UAH 10-15 billion.

The second - the NBU interest expenses for 2022 amounted to UAH 46. 6 billion (including the NBU - UAH 40. 466 billion), for comparison: in 2021 - only UAH 15. 19 billion. That is, more than UAH 30 billion has gone to increase payments to the NBU. Suppose that a key rate still need to be kept at 15-20% in order to contain inflation. That is, expenditures on the NBU DS would still increase, but not to UAH 40. 766 billion.

As a result, the state budget from a clearly inflated discount rate lacked about UAH 15-20 billion that went to the pocket of banks. And third: raising the rate to 25%, the NBU automatically blocked the Ministry of Finance's borrowing channel through the T -bills. It is so arranged that banks, insurers and other non -bank financial institutions cannot keep all the liquidity in money. Although the rate will be 10%, although 15% or 19. 99% - they are forced to buy government bonds.

And when there was an alternative in the form of the NBU at 23%, which of the banks will buy T-bills at 10-15%? With the upgrading of the NBU leadership, the problem was softened with the problem, but did not solve. According to my estimates, banks could be invested in the ATP in 2023 an additional UAH 150-250 billion, but the rate is kept stubbornly, and with it the liquidity in the NBU DS.

At the beginning of the war, a simple soldier received approximately 40,000 UAH: 10 000 UAH of salary and 30 000 UAH surcharged for the fact that the war was going. When the soldier gets to the front, he receives a supplement of 100,000 UAH. But later they began to save: a soldier in the rear raised a salary to 20 000 UAH, but took a supplement of 30,000. And indeed, is it worth paying a soldier 40,000 UAH if he guarded, say, bridges in Transcarpathia? It turns out what is worth.

The general scheme is such that there are 25-30% of personnel on the front line, after a while there is a rotation and new 25-30% are sent to the front, and others are restored in the rear. And after the reform, for the sake of saving military enlistments, they began to complain that the influx of people, namely volunteers and motivated, decreased. And what is the motivation of a soldier? He had 40 000 UAH. During the year, inflation was 26.

6%, but instead of indexation, the income decreased on the contrary and became UAH 20,000. The state budget from a clearly inflated discount rate has not received approximately UAH 15-20 billion that went to the pocket of banks. Today, this is not a competitive payment on the market, as a consequence, the rate of filling of personnel has decreased. And forcibly people into the army cannot be delayed, because Ukraine is not Russia.

And this I do not talk about the costs of the military for independent purchase of equipment, treatment after injuries, etc. The "good" deputies noticed that the armies needed help, quickly registered the bill 8312 and accepted it, which wanted to return 30,000 UAH of surcharges. But they were so "good" that they included up to 8312 police and SES, although the sources of payments were not provided and essentially simply substituted the current power.

And this is in the midst of preparation for the counter -offensive. And now let's return to sources of funding: as a result, we have 25-35 billion underpassed income of the state budget in 2023 at the expense of NBU mistakes in 2022 and incorrect behavior of the NBU with the Ministry of Finance. For reference: UAH 35 billion is the restoration of surcharges by the military by the end of the year in the amount of 10 000 UAH.