Ukraine between Putin and Erdogan. Turkish malice against the "Russian world"
What do Turkish regional policy intake look like and what do Ukraine mean for Ukraine? The following year, Turkey will celebrate the 100th anniversary of its existence in the modern format-actually as a secular republic. This date is this date or sad? In recent years, it is increasingly difficult to answer this question.
After the elimination of the Ottoman Empire and the renunciation of the last Sultan from power, Turkey - once a state with a world influence - became an ordinary country of the third world. It was quickly accepted in NATO to complicate the USSR access to the Mediterranean and be able to place military bases near its borders. But with the collapse of the Soviet state, the geopolitical prospects of Turkey looked doubtful.
He has been selected in the first national elections in 2014 by Turkish President Recep TaiP Erdogan for almost decades not only has been implementing his own ambitions, but also leading a country with a new course - with increased (or restoration) of influence in the Caspian region and attempts to "rebuild" the new Ottoman Empire.
The 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic for Erdogan is unlikely to be a personal holiday-its policy is clearly conservative and revenge, and the fall of the monarchy for him is probably a tragedy. But it can be assumed that Rezhep Erdogan would like to survive (and even better-to send) by 2053, when it will be possible to celebrate the 600th anniversary of the capture of Constantinople.
Turkey remains a democratic state (NATO membership obliges), so Erdogan's next election can be quite realistically lost. But so far, he stands in the helm. Who for us Turkey under the control of Erdogan? During the reign of Erdogan, Turkey objectively became a regional leader, and it was in this status that he arrived in August to meet Putin to Sochi. And the Turkish leader went not to discuss not the problems of Ukraine (surprise), but the interaction of Turkey and Russia in new conditions.
They had to discuss them, because these two states intersect from Ukraine to Somalia and Libya to Afghanistan. A significant trump card for Erdogan is the situation in Afghanistan. After all, Turkey is the only member of NATO, against whom it is impossible to declare jihad - Muslims a priori. In addition, the Turks also profess the Sunni variant of Islam (unlike Iran). For the Turkey Turkey, it is an important point of contact with the Western world.
They may also be interested in Ankara by the fact that the Turkic Muslim countries are located north of them, which establish authoritarian regimes, whose power is largely based on Russian bayonets. If with the internal opposition, the security forces of Central Asian autocractions can still cope (if they want), then resist the Taliban, which in a few weeks defeated the Afghan government army equipped with Americans, it will be extremely difficult for them.
Turkey has long sought to penetrate Central Asia. For this purpose, the Turkic state organization was created, which promotes the concept of the Turkic world. However, there was a powerful presence in the region of the Russian Federation. Now a historical chance has fallen for this. And there to the Russian territories Altai, Siberia and Yakutia near. No wonder they are marked on the donated Erdogan at the last conference of the map.
Turkey has every chance of replacing the Russian Federation as a guarantor of the Security System in Central Asia. The fact that the Turkish leader was flying from the standpoint of force is eloquently indicated that on the eve of the visit to the local offensive, Azerbaijan went to the local offensive. To Afghanistan is far away, but Azerbaijan is a close ally and geography and spirit.
In 2020, Russia retained their faces, "selling" her the opportunity to resolve a conflict without the United States (the overthrow of American dominance - Putin's pink dream). However, economically, Russia then lost a monopoly on the transit of Caspian gas to Europe and practically left its ally - Armenia.
Currently, Moscow has virtually no levers of influence on the events in the Caucasus, and the fate of Armenia depends not on the will of the Kremlin, but on the influence of its diaspora in the West. And, of course, any conversation is now impossible without discussing the Ukrainian issue. Putin and Erdogan both admire history. Accordingly, they know well what the expansion of the Russian Federation in the Northern Black Sea leads.
Previously, only the intercession of the Western powers saved Turkey from the loss of control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and possibly the loss of Constantinople. This ended with Turkey's joining NATO, which is now limiting space for maneuver on the Ukrainian issue. The Russian-Ukrainian War of Turkey on the hand. It tied the Russian Federation and created a vacuum in the regions of strategic interests of Ankara, especially in the North Caucasus and Central Asia.
But the final defeat of Turkey will not fully suit, because too large -scale vacuum of power can call the heavier and toothed predators. Therefore, Erdogan remains to squeeze the maximum of what is now - and forge iron while it is hot. The truth is that Turkey for Ukraine is just a powerful neighbor with great ambitions that pursues its interests.
In the spectrum of our dimension, these interests look like this: the construction of NPPs, and even more so, ephemeral phrases about trade cooperation - this can only be the tip of the iceberg. Paying for gas rubles is generally a debate from a completely different plane. The Turks have long been playing with supporters of the destruction of a dollar monopoly. And it is not only a Russian Federation that is now a locomotive of this process.
The key concessions of the Kremlin will be known to the general public later. It can be, for example, informal unlocking of exports of Central Asian energy, which are now informally blocked by Moscow. It is also worth paying attention to the statements about the construction of the plantar production plant in Ukraine by the end of 2023. Along with the lack of a final press conference, this may indicate the complexity or even the failure of the negotiation.
So we see that Ukraine, most likely, was not at the center of Erdogan and Putin's meeting, although the Russian-Ukrainian war was undoubtedly its main background. Akela missed, and Erdogan came to squeeze him. Trying to play the same cynical geopolitical game in international relations is in no way.
In some places, the interests of Ukraine and Turkey are closely intertwined: as in military-industrial cooperation (and it is not just about the barkrains) or in the issue of grain corridors (it is important to sell its grain for Ukraine, and for Turkey-to demonstrate the opportunity to provide logistics). The more such projects our diplomacy will find, the more often Ankara will act as our friend. Nothing personal.
So, in principle, international relations are built, simply in the case of Turkey it is the most noticeably ordinary observers. When it comes to international politics, it is difficult to find a more accurate statement than the one who has led over one hundred and fifty years ago by Lord Henry Palmerston: "There are no enemies in Britain, there are no eternal friends in Britain. There are only eternal interests in Britain.