C-400, sanctions and restraint of China. How does Russia affect India and US relations
On January 31, 2023, national security advisers and other US and India heads met in Washington at the first meeting of the initiative on critical and latest technologies. The day before, they met with private industry leaders and academic circles, making it clear that the development of advanced technologies requires more cooperation between the two countries. The US and India have agreed to start cooperation with a number of technological projects, and some of them have defensive use.
This meeting was a prominent step forward for two partners, who only survived a period of tension in politics a few months ago. Focus translated Erin Mello's article about the influence of the Russian Federation on Washington's relations with New Deli. American-Indian relations are developing through programs such as initiative on critical and latest technologies, but at the same time suffer from the difficulties created by Russia.
The different reaction of the two countries to the invasion of Ukraine reminded of the ancient defensive ties of New Delhi with Russia, which leads to tensions in relations with Washington. India's continuous defensive relations with Russia creates new problems for Washington. The United States must work on deepening ties with their Indian partners and facilitate their departure from Russia, helping them meet their defensive needs, especially in the Indian Ocean.
In order to solve the Russian problem in American-Indian relations, Washington will have to abolish India's threat sanctions for the purchase of Russian C-400, as well as focus on increasing the Indian Protectic defense potential to counteract the threat from China. India is still guided by the principle of strategic autonomy, which is aimed at maximizing the expansion of the freedom of political maneuver.
The country avoids formal unions and maintains partnerships based on common problems, not on some ideology. As a result of India, it is possible to maintain relations with different countries, including the US and Russia. Delhi has maintained political and defensive ties with Moscow since the 1970s, and unfortunately Washington. Last year, India and Russia conducted its first 2+2 dialogue, which makes Russia a single country that is not included in the four with which India has a 2+2 dialogue.
In addition, most of the Indian military equipment of the Army, Fleet and Air Force is of Russian or Soviet origin, including T-90 and T-72 tanks used by the Indian Army, Su-30 Indian Air Force Air Force and Frags with the Talwar Navy Rockets India. Despite the decline in defense purchases in Russia, India increased the purchase of Russian oil after invasion of Ukraine last year and was restrained in its statements about the war.
India also threaten US sanctions for buying a Russian anti-aircraft missile system C-400 in accordance with the US Act of 2017 under the title "Act to Countells Opponents of America because of sanctions. " These sanctions have already been imposed on Turkey through the purchase of the C-400. The question of the exclusion of India from the sub-countries has already been discussed, but this has not happened.
Washington's attitude to India has traditionally been revealed "strategic altruism": the United States supports India's strong military terms, despite bilateral problems, based on the fact that India is a natural counterweight in China's growing power. However, the United States has long been concerned about New Delhi's defense relations with Moscow. This argument was guided by Washington when he eventually excluded Turkey from the F-35 joint production program.
As the US-Indian relations in the field of defense move to the procurement of more advanced technologies and cooperation, the possession of Russian technologies is an obvious potential obstacle to expanding relations with India. Since independence, India's land troops have been more priority for Indian officials and politicians than other types of armed forces.
This is due to the concern about the demarcation line between India and China, known as the actual control line, as well as the control line between India and Pakistan. However, the naval presence of China in the Indian Ocean, which makes New Delhi again show interest in the sea forces and engage in their ability to withstand the predictable threats.
The Indian Navy strategy assumes that they should be able to exercise maritime control over the entire Indian Ocean - a clear task, given that these forces are allocated the smallest part of India's defense budget. Since 2009, the Navy of the People's Liberation Army of China has expanded their presence in the Indian Ocean, for example, within the framework of anti-corporate missions in the Gulf of Aden. Chinese submarines are constantly increasing their presence.
In 2014, one of these submarines was even rolled up in Kolombo's port in Sri Lanka. Therefore, awareness of the sea space and the Protetic War become a priority for the Indian fleet. Russia's invasion of Ukraine also complicated India's maritime defense. India purchases gas turbine engines for its Talwar frigates in Ukraine, and ships are being built in Russia. But the war led to a delay in the supply of these frigates.
New Delhi already uses her relations with Washington to improve awareness of the Marine Space of the Indian Ocean. Marine security and related opportunities have become an integral part of most US-Indian strategic interactions, including non-obvious ones, such as the initiative on critical and new technologies has just signed. To date, India has purchased protically aircraft, including P-8I and MH-60R helicopters, and also leased the SEA Guardian drones.
Indian officials want to develop the country's protophic combat potential and improve technology transfer, ideally through joint developments, not just purchase through foreign military sales or leasing. Russia remains the main arms supplier for the Indian Armed Forces, but the United States has more opportunities to help India in meeting its urgent needs in connection with the coincidence of Washington's priorities and New Delhi in the Indian Ocean.
Because the United States competes with China, the support of India's military force is no longer a question of "strategic altruism" is American interest. In the future, the United States should avoid India's public ultimatums from all points of differences, including New Dely's relationship with Moscow. Instead, officials should discuss bilateral issues privately.
India is unlikely to completely abandon relations with Russia, based not only on the principle of strategic autonomy of New Delhi, but also from the need of India in C-400 and other Russian systems for territorial defense against China and Pakistan. There are virtually no good alternatives to these systems at such a price.
Therefore, the imposition of sanctions against India, which is so slowly moving from historical dependence on Russian weapons, will most likely make India ask their relations with the United States, not with Russia. The abolition of sanctions on C-400 and other Russian systems will confirm India that the United States is a reliable partner, and may further push India to abandon historically formed relations with Russia.
Practice shows that the abolition of US sanctions on India can pave the way of expanding bilateral defense relations. Analysts point to the 2005 nuclear agreement, which was a concern for Washington regarding India's nuclear program as a turning point in American-Indian relations. However, this agreement would not have taken place if Washington had not lifted sanctions from India in 2001.
This has led to a significant expansion of defense, including the signing in 2002 (after 15 years of negotiations) of the Agreement on General Safety of Military Information, the US-Indian Framework Defense Program of 2005, as well as an increase in Indian defense procurement in the United States. The United States should also focus their efforts on niche, not occupied by Russia, in American-Indian defensive relations, even more encouraging New Dely from Moscow.
The United States cannot replace all Indian equipment of Russian origin. However, they can provide India with the opportunities other than Moscow provides, based on new and future needs of New Delhi. Therefore, the United States should become the necessary partner for India, avoiding unnecessary concern about prompt compatibility or security. The US should focus on ensuring the ability of Indian Navy to perform maritime opposition in critical nodal points leading to the Indian Ocean.
Improving the potential of the Indian Navy in the field of marine counteraction supplemented by US-Indian operational compatibility in the sea will give India a more accurate and complete picture of Chinese presence around marine communications lines and will create potential options for responding to Chinese underwater vessels. This will blocking Chinese communication lines by making Chinese operations more risky, which failure is more likely.
Although the support of the Arsenal of platforms focused on the Protect War is crucial, only purchases are unlikely to help the Indian fleet to achieve their goals. The cost of American equipment is huge against the background of economic restrictions on India, which is also limited by its principle of "Atmanirbhart", or self -sufficiency, which gives priority to internal or local defense development and production, rather than foreign purchases.
These restrictions are exacerbated by the low level of financing of the Indian Fleet, which makes New Delhi participate in joint developments with the United States. In 2012, India and the US created an initiative on defense technologies and trade aimed at creating conditions for joint development and production in reducing bureaucratic obstacles in both American and Indian systems. However, over the last decade, this initiative has not developed due to the differences in expectations.
However, in September 2021, the United States and India signed an agreement on joint development of aircraft aircraft aircraft, which is a promising step in the right direction. In the future, the United States and India should also look for joint development opportunities that could improve India's potential for counteracting sea. For example, both states could jointly develop a large or superfluous unmanned underwater vessel.
Neither India nor the United States have such technology, although the United States has concluded a contract with Boeing for the development of excess unmanned submarines for the US Navy. Such vessels are capable of carrying electronic intelligence sensors to improve awareness of sea space. This is definitely an ambitious task for a trade initiative, which has not made significant success in 10 years of its existence.
However, if India and the United States are unable to develop such excess vessels, they can jointly produce or develop a subsystem, such as an electromagnetic sensor used to detect and track, or a battery type. American officials working with India should remember that India is looking for available equipment, not new high -tech platforms.
The United States and India could also improve their operational compatibility by conducting bilateral exercises in the Protetic Defense in the Andaman Sea in the area of a critically important nodal point - the Malacca Strait. Conducting exercises in the Andaman Sea is crucial, since the success of the Protetic War depends largely on the operating environment.
Studying elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region will have little to increase the ability of the United States and India to track and restrain China from expansion to the Indian Ocean. India has already conducted bilateral exercises with Singapour, as well as three- and multilateral exercises, such as Singapore, India, Thailand and Milan in the Andaman Sea. However, the United States has not yet participated in them.
India is also likely to be more open to new bilateral exercises than the US participation in existing exercises, as it still seeks to maintain its position of regional leader in the Indian Ocean. US participation can be seen as an attempt to displace India from the role of a security guarantor in the region. Strong American-Indian defense-based defense relations will be crucial, taking into account the continuation of the Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean.
In view of this, the United States should support India's role as a security guarantor in the region. Erin Mello is an invited researcher at the Asia-Pacific Research Center of Stanford University, where she conducted investigations of obstacles and opportunities for American-Indian relations in the field of defense. She worked for 8 years in the Ministry of Defense, and has served in the Indo-Pacific Command of the United States as an analyst from South Asia for the last 2. 5 years.