China Vs Taiwan. Part Two: If a War begins
Taiwan defense forces move their own means, personnel will be hidden in storage, aviation will be lifted into the air, and the fleet will change the location and prepare for the attack. The only air defense system and Taiwan, the high density of air defense, a large number of fighter jets (140 only F-16) tell us that the suppression of this air defense system and about it will take a long time. And this despite the fact that Taiwan's aircraft can be called somewhat outdated.
There were also outdated systems in Ukraine, but we were able to knock down a large number of missiles even with the help of Soviet air defense. Therefore, the probability that China will be able to realize its own theoretical technical advantage and real quantitative during the rocket stage of the operation is not very high.
In addition, if Taiwan is able to knock down China's satellites, it is not very clear at all how China will receive targets in general, because air intelligence will not be a long time. Victory, provided that it will be achieved at all, will not be fast. It is difficult to evaluate, but most likely it is about months. During the rocket launcher, the Chinese fleet will operate at a huge combat theater, very often in separation from its own bases.
Taiwan will be able to store part of the fleet for a long time under the umbrella of the island air defense and about. This will allow the Taiwanese fleet to perform operations against the Navy of Chinese. China's readiness for this volume of operation is a good question, but we can say that China has no experience on such a big front. Those who have seen the US providing their own aircraft carriers and the fleet understand how difficult it is.
China is still working on creating a global radar intelligence system in the sea, the approximate completion period is 2025. Under these conditions, the Navy will only be able to act effectively, then will start catching up with logistics. The ability of China fleet to provide Tai -Taiwan blockade under such conditions (taking into account the need for a fleet to hide from the US Navy attack and escort) does not seem very high.
In addition, Taiwan has a considerable, though somewhat outdated fleet. However, there are many modern anti -ship missiles in service. No one knows how much and what their efficiency is, because most anti -ship missiles in Taiwan are their own production. The destruction of the fleet that is under the umbrella of the island air defense and about, another not too simple task. It will be a duel on anti -ship missiles whose experience does not have Taiwan.
But Taiwan will be tasked with keeping your fleet as long as possible and in the most relevant ways. And China's fleet will have to destroy Taiwan fleet in the face of air defense and AB. Taiwana China is likely to completely neutralize Taiwan's fleet when Taiwan's aircraft is suppressed. So, here, the victory will not be fast and will lead to numerous losses of the Navy of China.
After China is approaching the neutralization of air defense and Taiwan or at least, it will not make it so dense, after blocking or at least a decrease in the combat capability of Taiwan's fleet will begin to hunt for anti -ship systems of land base and Himars. Again the difficult task. Probably, part of China's fleet will become targets that will carry enemy complexes for buildings and shelters.
Even if the main radar is destroyed, Taiwan will have information about the actions of enemy fleet and rocket artillery. Only after the defense of the air defense and Taiwan, after the destruction or neutralization of the Taiwan fleet, can surgery from the marine landing begin and the "savage strategy" will start operating.
As I said, it is very difficult to estimate the duration of different phases, but most likely it is a year round from the beginning of the active phase and a year and a half from the beginning of mobilization in China. Taiwan has a considerable number of artillery systems that can effectively counteract the landing and aviation, China will have to destroy the larger part of them, otherwise any landing will end on the coast.
Similarly, the landing of the air landing will also be a difficult task, because it is unknown how to maintain an airborne landing when any infantry with a wall from a hat can extinguish all transport sides in the sky. Similarly, MSrCs will create huge problems for bombing aviation, UAVs and air intelligence, even after the destruction of the island's system air defense.
How long will it take for a landing operation, what will be its effectiveness, what losses and how the logistics of maintaining the marine landing on the island will act - no one can say. It will depend to a large extent on the Taiwan's resilience and how they respond to rocket terror, which will be fuel reserves and food at the time of the Communist landing operation.
Even simple supply of small arms of thousands and 40 mm of grenade launchers, anti-tank missiles and ordinary anti-personnel or anti-tank mines of any generation can create a situation where every Chinese landing building will take huge losses. During mobilization in China, Taiwan will be able to replace both mines and simple explosives (remember that stones everywhere) dozens of square kilometers of convenient places for planting and directions of major blows.
If we reject the political possibility of Taiwan's surrender, then it seems purely from the standpoint of military resistance, it seems that again about the months at least. And this is provided that the Chinese landing will be successful at all. Imagine landing on a replaced shore, a dense fire from fortifications and buildings. Mobile groups operate in familiar places, know the passageways in the minefields and can move blindly. Even yesterday's civilian and arch can be adjusted by artillery.
Mobile groups with MSRCs on all buildings will significantly complicate aviation. The landing will only have a ship support, but they will even be able to provide it under the sight of the residues of anti -ship complexes of land base. It will be extremely difficult to deploy a landing artillery in such conditions. The opposition of the EW will lead to the fact that the Chinese landing is half -blind and will not be able to effectively use the support of the fleet or missiles to dispose of goals.
And there will be many such goals. Even after fixing the Chinese on the shore, the Taiwan defense will be able to defend every building for a long time, because the personnel army will operate with the local who know each basement and entrance. Staff, 40 mm grenade launchers, PTRCs and ordinary mines will make China throw infantry parts to the enthusiastic shore and literally block each area with bodies.
The experience of such actions will not be both Taiwan and Chinese, but in defense on their own land, it is much easier in their area. If the marine landing is successful, the police part of the mission will begin. It seems to be the easiest stage for China, because Chinese special services have considerable experience in this. Conclusions all surgery from the beginning of mobilization to the beginning of the police phase will last for at least two years.
All this time, China will be undergoing intensifying sanctions. The consequences of these sanctions and the ability of the US Navy to arrest and break civil logistics for China. Economically, China will be destroyed, although it is unlikely to affect the political stability of the Communist Party. After all, in China, there are enough food stocks, and it is very skillful to control their own citizens. Part of China's personnel army, much of the aviation and fleet will be destroyed.
Chinese civilian objects, such as regasification terminals, oil terminals, and more may be destroyed during sabotage attacks. Missile reserves, reserves of managed aviation missiles will be almost spent. The losses of modern artillery, landing vessels, amphibious equipment will be huge. Under these conditions, understanding all the consequences, it is difficult to imagine that China will start this operation or even preparation for it.
It is practically deliberate destruction of one's own economy and a capable army for the sake of theoretical ability to join the territory that will have to be rebuilt from scratch. This again does not mean that China will not go to it.
Yes, Taiwan can become a land aircraft carrier, but in what state will China fleet be after such a war? Will China be an example of military force or, conversely, many countries will consider that the Chinese army is worth nothing? How will the Pacific countries treat China's aggressive actions, even if they are successful? The alliance with Europe is likely to be forgotten, which is the loss of the huge market, in addition to the markets of the United States and Japan.
In this case, reformatting the economy of China is very difficult to imagine and it is not very clear what resources in China will the middle class grow in if China even decides to focus on its own market? These cannot lose your face, so it will just have to win. But every stage of the operation, except police and mobilization, may not be successful. Missile strikes and aviation terror do not necessarily promise that air defense and Taiwan will be neutralized.
Even if the air defense and about and are neutralized, you still need to destroy mobile installations on the ground. This stage may also not be successful because Taiwan produces anti -ship missiles. In this case, the landing operation cannot be discussed, because all the landing will be destroyed in the sea. The prospects of landing surgery are also ghostly.
Even in the case of successful landing and fixing on the shore, even if Chinese logistics pulls off and providing the Land Forces for the entire Chinese army, it will not 100% mean the occupation success for a reasonable time. Bloody and exhausting operation will make China an exile around the world, and the United States will be able to block Chinese business around the world. Which can reduce long surgery efficiency of cyberattacks and/or sabotage.
If China is able to disconnect any air defense and ABC with damage or work, it can cause the first stroke to be successful. But China cannot be sure that Chinese hackers or agents will succeed. Are there any more reliable means? Calculation of air defense and about. China knows the maximum number of missiles that can knock down the fleet, air defense and Taiwan per unit of time, at least approximately.
In addition, China has super-fast UAVs that are theoretically capable of breaking any about (for example, WU-14, it is DF-ZF). Brutfors mass missile launchers (including a large number of medium -range ballistic missiles with conventional BC) with the simultaneous use of aviation can lead to the fact that China will destroy Taiwan's main radar and many air defense complexes with the first blow.
Just because the Chinese will release more rockets than Taiwan aircraft even theoretically able to intercept. There are several problems for China. Some of the nuclear weapons will have to be charged with ordinary BCs, which causes Taiwanese to be able to hit China while China is busy with Taiwan. In addition, even after the destruction of Taiwan's best radars, he will probably be able to receive information from the US fleet in the region.
The mass launch of ballistic missiles even medium range is a very threatening step, China cannot neglect the likelihood of the US and other countries, so it will have to warn the US and neighbors about starting surgery. Taiwan learns about it, of course. Difficult situation. Another step to complete everything either quickly or not start at all is the possibility of political agreement after mobilization, but before the operation.
In the conditions where Si can threaten the start of operation at any cost, Taiwan can go to negotiations to create the opportunity for SI to receive and sell to his own citizens, and Taiwan not lose his own economy. It is not really difficult to imagine this design. This is indicated by the results of the local elections in Taiwan. Homindan showed a good result in the local elections. This party is in favor of establishing relations with China.
And by 2024, when there will be a general election in Taiwan, China will have the illusion of the possibility of establishing a dialogue with Taiwan by strengthening Komindan's positions. Or will be able to assist Kuomindan against the current Taiwan Democratic Party and hope for the effectiveness of economic impact on Taiwan.
Separately, I note that the results of local elections can hardly be considered as a Processing break in Taiwan's politics, but rather this is a consequence of Taiwan's internal problems and the problems of the ruling party. Taiwan's integration with the Chinese economy remains very significant, it increases the likelihood of political resolution of conflict, as well as many years before.
It is best for China in this case not to start preparing for surgery, but on the contrary, to symbolize performance and peacefulness and to hope for a long way of economic integration. As it turns out, after the Taiwanese saw Hong Kong, no one knows. The problem is that as I noted in the thesis, if Taiwan fundamentally refuses negotiations or concessions, these will have to start war. At the same time to start a war that is unknown, China is unlikely to want.
The most rational policy would be to tell that these wants to unite with Taiwan economic and political way, play on Taiwan's internal problems and sell it to the people and parties. The Chinese project does not have an attractive goal for both its own and a large number of elite groups. The new silk path as an idea that has been built in the region for over half a century, where the situation may change for five years, seems discredited even among Chinese elites.
The concept of reorientation to its own market cracks at the seams, because the CCP prefers to produce the means of production, not to promote the emergence of the middle class. It is still not clear how "digital gulag" will be controlled by this middle class. In society, fatigue from zero tolerance policies has accumulated, the debt load is increasing, and the economy slows down.
All this can lead to the idea that the external escalation option is more attractive than the continuation of internal terror for the sake of control. Because where to go in the inner terror? However, as you saw from the text, at many stages of possible operation success is not guaranteed and it depends on a large number of factors that are very difficult to evaluate. On the one hand, it seems that nothing but a small victorious war is left.
On the other hand, it is not necessary to start it, because it is unclear whether it will work and even if it turns out, it is unclear how to end that war. No external success can cover the volumes of operation required for Taiwan's successful occupation. This is how the circumstances were, such a distribution of forces around China. No situation that China can receive theoretically after Taiwan's capture will be able to overcome the disadvantages that China collects during occupation.
This tells us that the decision to start Taiwan's occupation or not to begin the CCP on the basis of internal factors. If you were waiting for a brief conclusion from this article, you can say that the available forces and means of both China and Taiwan do not allow to say unambiguously whether China will be attacked on Taiwan or not (if the US conflict is not interference directly). The answer can only understand the trends of trends within China.